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Legislative lawsuits are a recurring by-product of divided govern-
ment. Yet the Supreme Court has never definitively resolved whether
Congress may sue the executive branch over its execution of the law.
Some scholars argue that Congress should be able to establish Article
III standing when its interests are harmed by executive action or
inaction just like private parties. Others, including most prominently
the late Justice Antonin Scalia, argue that intergovernmental
disputes do not constitute Article III “cases” or “controversies” at all.
Rather, the Framers envisioned the political branches resolving their
differences through nonjudicial means.
This Article proposes a different approach to congressional law-
suits loosely derived from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s majority
opinion in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Re-
districting Commission and the “equitable discretion” doctrine once
utilized in the D.C. Circuit. Under what this Article terms the
“Legislative Exhaustion” principle, Congress would be barred from
federal court whenever it has nonjudicial means to obtain the remedy
it seeks against the Executive. Conversely, when Congress has no way
to directly overrule the Executive, such as when the Executive refuses
to enforce a law based on constitutional objections, federal courts
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could resolve the constitutional dispute. Not only is such an exhaus-
tion principle consistent with prudential doctrines, preserving ju-
dicial resources for cases that demand adjudication, but it also
encourages the most important normative benefit the Framers hoped
to achieve from interbranch disputes—namely, enhanced legislative
deliberation concerning the merits of government policy. Thus, there
is no single answer to whether Congress may sue the Executive.
Rather, it depends on the nature of the claim and the nonjudicial
remedies available to Congress.
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INTRODUCTION
May Congress sue the executive branch over its execution of the
law? This thorny question has long bedeviled scholars and courts.
Much of the debate has revolved around whether Congress can
establish Article III standing when the Executive acts in a way that
Congress claims violates the Constitution or is contrary to federal
law, including executive choices not to enforce the law, either cate-
gorically or in specific cases.1 Some argue that Congress may avail
itself of the federal courts when its interests are harmed just like
private parties.2 Others, including most prominently the late Justice
Antonin Scalia, have argued that intergovernmental disputes do not
constitute Article III “cases” or “controversies” at all and that the
1. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Essay, Article III Double-Dipping: Proposition 8’s
Sponsors, BLAG, and the Government’s Interest, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 164, 173 (2013)
(“Congress may not have a cognizable Article III interest in defending a challenged law, given
that it lacks the power to enforce that law.”); Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Executive
Nondefense and the Principal-Agent Problem, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1201, 1247-54 (2012)
(arguing that Congress or outside counsel should have standing to defend laws in the absence
of the Executive); Abner S. Greene, Interpretive Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing
Can Solve the Enforce-but-Not-Defend Problem, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 578, 582 (2012)
(arguing that Congress should have standing to defend federal laws when the Executive
declines to do so and to seek declaratory judgments when the Executive declines to enforce
the law); Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1355
(2014) (doubting whether “Congress would have standing to assert an ‘institutional injury’
arising out of the invalidation of a federal statute”); Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional
Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L. REV. 339, 343 (2015) (advancing a theory of
congressional standing based on injuries to Congress’s functions). But see BRUCE ACKERMAN,
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 143-46 (2010) (proposing a “Supreme
Executive Tribunal” to hear congressional suits challenging presidential actions without
establishing the traditional elements of standing); Grove, supra, at 1314 (looking to Article
I and Article II rather than Article III for the source of Congress’s authority to step into
court); Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in
Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 573 (2014) (arguing that structural constitutional principles
preclude congressional standing to defend federal laws but not to enforce subpoenas or other
internal rules); John Harrison, Legislative Power, Executive Duty, and Legislative Lawsuits,
31 J.L. & POL. 103, 105 (2015) (arguing that “judicial power, cases and controversies, and
judicial role [are] a distraction from the real issues” involved in interbranch disputes).
2. See, e.g., Gorod, supra note 1, at 1249 & n.214 (suggesting that Congress is
institutionally injured when the Executive does not defend a law); Greene, supra note 1, at
588 (arguing that Congress is injured when the Executive does not enforce the law); Nash,
supra note 1, at 373-79 (advocating for congressional standing in circumstances in which the
executive branch nullifies congressional votes, withholds information, or threatens permanent
and substantial injury to congressional bargaining power).
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Framers envisioned the political branches resolving their differ-
ences through nonjudicial means.3 Meanwhile, the federal courts are
once again faced with the question in a lawsuit brought by the
House of Representatives over the implementation of the Affordable
Care Act.4
Enter Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Arizona
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission
(Arizona v. Arizona), issued on the last day of the 2014-2015 Term.5
The case required the Court to decide whether the Arizona State
Legislature had standing to sue an independent state agency that
the voters of Arizona created using a ballot initiative.6 In resolving
this question, the Court asked whether the legislature had any
nonjudicial means of regaining its redistricting authority.7 Because
3. See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2694 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Disputes between governmental branches or departments
regarding the allocation of political power do not in my view constitute ‘cases’ or
‘controversies’ committed to our resolution by Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution.”); United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2702 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The matter ... ought
to be left[ ] to a tug of war between the President and the Congress, which has innumerable
means (up to and including impeachment) of compelling the President to enforce the laws it
has written.”); id. at 2704 (arguing that “the impairment of a branch’s powers alone” has
never “conferred standing to commence litigation”); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the
allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a
constitutional impasse.”); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS 263-65 (1980) (arguing that courts should abstain from adjudicating disputes
between the political branches over their respective powers); Harrison, supra note 1, at 105
(“Executive failure properly to carry out the law does not harm the legislative power as such,
because legislative power is fully effective when it issues a valid law, and executive default
does not impair validity.”). Professors Grove and Devins similarly look beyond Article III to
understand these types of lawsuits. See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 627.
4. See Complaint at 4, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53
(D.D.C. 2015) (No. 14-cv-01967(RMC)) (“The House now brings this civil action for declaratory
and injunctive relief to halt these unconstitutional and unlawful actions which usurp the
House’s Article I legislative powers.”). As this Article went to press, the House moved to hold
briefing on the appeal in the case in abeyance until February 21, 2017, in light of the election
of Donald J. Trump and the approach of unified government under Republican control.
Appellee’s Motion to Hold Briefing in Abeyance or, in the Alternative, to Extend the Briefing
Schedule, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 16-5202 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 2016).
5. 135 S. Ct. at 2652. Throughout the text of this Article, this case is referred to as
Arizona v. Arizona.
6. See id. at 2659.
7. See id. at 2663-66. Although the Court held that the state legislature’s “alleged injury”
was not “too ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’ to establish standing,” id. at 2663 (quoting Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)), this conclusion seemed to depend entirely on
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the Court believed any action by the legislature would have been
futile under the Arizona Constitution, the Court held that the suit
was ripe for adjudication on the merits.8
Although Justice Ginsburg cast her opinion within the traditional
framework for analyzing Article III standing and disclaimed any
implications for interbranch disputes at the federal level,9 her
opinion points toward a different approach to legislative standing.
Under what this Article terms the “Legislative Exhaustion” princi-
ple, federal courts faced with complaints by Congress challenging
executive action would ask whether Congress had any nonjudicial
means of remedying its alleged harm.10 If so, Congress would be pre-
cluded from availing itself of federal court jurisdiction. Not only is
such an exhaustion principle supported by prudential doctrines
preserving judicial resources for cases that demand adjudication,11
it is also consistent with the normative benefits the Framers hoped
to achieve from interbranch conflict in a presidential system.
The Framers separated the government of the new Republic into
competitive branches not merely to diffuse power, but also to en-
courage more robust deliberation on the merits of controversial pub-
lic policies.12 Although the Framers failed to anticipate the role that
the Court’s discussion of the futility of the Legislature pursuing nonjudicial means to assert
its congressional redistricting authority, see id.
8. See id. at 2665-66.
9. See id. at 2665 n.12.
10. As discussed more fully below in Part I.E, Justice Ginsburg’s approach shares many
characteristics with the “equitable discretion” principle that the D.C. Circuit used in the
1980s to dismiss suits of legislative plaintiffs who might otherwise have Article III standing
when the “congressional plaintiff could obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators
through the enactment, repeal, or amendment of a statute.” Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm.,
656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Justice Ginsburg sat on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
from 1980 to 1993. Elizabeth E. Gillman & Joseph M. Micheletti, Essay, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 657, 660-61 (1993).
11. Cf. Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 562, 569 (2009) (“[M]oot cases tended to focus not on constitutional text, but on in-
strumental concerns, such as conservation of judicial resources.”); Bradford C. Mank, Is
Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 413, 421 (2013) (indicating that
prudential standing requirements limit “unreasonable demands on limited judicial resources
or for other judicial policy reasons”).
12. See JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 46 (1994); ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO:
TOUCHSTONE OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 15-16 (1988); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-
Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351, 373-74 (2014). The most familiar mechanisms for ac-
complishing this are bicameralism and presentment, along with the President’s limited veto
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political parties would come to play in the new Republic, the democ-
ratization of the franchise, or the greater importance of nongov-
ernmental parties in shaping public opinion, legislative deliberation
remains a vital normative goal of interbranch conflict. Moreover,
this goal is in considerable tension with judicial resolution of inter-
branch policy disputes. Courts generally review executive action
based on their interpretation of what a statute directs the Executive
to do, not what they think is the best policy on the merits.13 The
political branches, by contrast, are free to follow their policy pre-
ferences when grappling over the details of government programs,
subject only to constitutional constraints.
Bringing this deliberation-forcing goal into focus suggests that
when Congress can overrule the Executive through legislative acts
that enhance deliberation on the merits of government policy—such
as when Congress does not like the Executive’s use of enforcement
discretion or its interpretation of the law—Congress should not have
access to the federal courts. Opening the courthouse door to Con-
gress deters and distracts from important legislative work refining
statutory regimes and government policy in response to changing
circumstances and executive initiatives. It is to this project that
Congress can bring the full value of its deliberative processes to
bear. Accordingly, there is generally less, not more, reason to allow
the legislature to avail itself of the federal courts to resolve what are
essentially political disputes between the branches over the merits
of government policy.
The question becomes more difficult, however, when Congress has
no tools to directly overrule the Executive, such as when the Execu-
tive refuses to enforce a statutory provision based on constitutional
objections. Although Congress can punish the Executive, such pun-
ishment is unlikely to produce deliberation on the merits of the
Executive’s actions. Moreover, such punitive action may damage
collateral policies and personnel for reasons unrelated to the merits
power, which force Congress to further debate the wisdom and substance of its legislative
acts. SPITZER, supra, at 15-16; Sant’Ambrogio, supra, at 354.
13. There are of course some areas of law in which the courts do inquire into the merits
of government policies, such as reviewing the constitutionality of acts under strict scrutiny
or applying arbitrary and capricious review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
But Congress still has much greater freedom to inquire into the merits of policies when
legislating than courts do when deciding how to interpret congressional acts.
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of the policy dispute. Therefore, allowing Congress into federal court
in such cases does not undermine the deliberation-forcing goals of
interbranch conflict.
Thus, the Legislative Exhaustion principle provides a relatively
easy way to resolve suits in which the Executive purports to act
pursuant to statutory authority. In such cases, Congress has not
exhausted its legislative remedies and should look to itself rather
than to the federal courts for its salvation. But the Legislative
Exhaustion principle would not preclude congressional lawsuits over
presidential decisions not to enforce the law based on constitutional
objections. When the President refuses to enforce a congressional
act based on constitutional objections, Congress has exhausted its
legislative remedies, and its weapons for battling the Executive are
unlikely to produce deliberation on the merits of the policy in
dispute. There may be other reasons to deny Congress standing in
such cases, but Legislative Exhaustion does not provide one.
Proposals for legislative standing usually seek to ensure judicial
resolution of constitutional questions and prevent executive officials
from exercising an “extra-legislative veto” over duly enacted law—in
other words, to prevent a unilateral check on statutory mandates
that the Executive exercises outside of the legislative process.14 This
Article suggests that both the focus on providing courts with the
final word on interbranch disputes and the desire to leave these
disputes to the political process ignore a fundamental objective of
interbranch competition—forcing enhanced political deliberation
over the merits of contested policies. Focusing on this goal illumi-
nates when judicial resolution of interbranch disputes is likely to
undermine the deliberative objectives of our Madisonian system.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I surveys the doctrinal
landscape of legislative standing and the difficulties of determining
whether Congress suffers an injury sufficient to support Article III
standing in disputes with the Executive. It closes with Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion in Arizona v. Arizona, which may have roots in
the D.C. Circuit’s “equitable discretion” doctrine, and begins to
outline the Legislative Exhaustion principle that might follow from
the opinion. Part II then turns to the Framers’ view of interbranch
14. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 12, at 354.
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conflict and their goal of enhancing political deliberation on the
merits of controversial policies. In light of this goal, Part II exam-
ines each tool available to Congress in disputes with the Executive
to determine which are likely to produce deliberation on the merits
of policy. Finally, Part III returns to the Legislative Exhaustion
principle with this deliberation-forcing goal in focus; further defines
how Legislative Exhaustion would operate in practice; examines the
principle’s strengths and weaknesses; and applies Legislative Ex-
haustion to U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell and other cases
of interbranch litigation.
I. LEGISLATIVE STANDING
The Supreme Court has long danced around the question of
whether Congress has standing to sue the Executive over its ex-
ecution or nonexecution of the law.15 The Court did this most
recently in Arizona v. Arizona, when it recognized the standing of a
state legislature to sue an independent state commission but
dropped a footnote explaining that the case did “not touch or con-
cern the question whether Congress ha[d] standing to bring a suit
against the President,” which “would raise separation-of-powers
concerns” that might trigger an “especially rigorous” standing
analysis.16 Two terms before, in United States v. Windsor, the Court
dodged the question whether the House of Representatives had
standing to defend a law the Executive argued was unconstitutional
15. See Nat Stern, The Indefinite Deflection of Congressional Standing, 43 PEPP. L. REV.
1, 19-42 (2015); The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Leading Cases, 111 HARV. L. REV. 197, 218
& n.1 (1997) (“After laying the foundation for the doctrine of legislative standing nearly sixty
years ago, the Supreme Court maintained a conspicuous silence, despite numerous
opportunities to address the issue.” (footnote omitted)); see also, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature
v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 n.12 (2015) (disclaiming any
implications of the opinion for “whether Congress has standing to bring a suit against the
President”); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (not deciding whether the
House had standing to defend the Defense of Marriage Act); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
721 (1986) (concluding that the Court “need not consider the standing issue as to the ...
Members of Congress” because another party had standing); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12
& n.10 (1976) (per curiam) (concluding that “at least some of the appellants,” which included
candidates for federal office, political parties, and nonprofit advocacy organizations chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act, “have a sufficient
‘personal stake’” to support standing).
16. 135 S. Ct. at 2665 n.12 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997)).
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by holding that the Executive’s pro forma appeal of lower court
orders gave the Court jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case
even though the Executive agreed with the lower courts that the law
was unconstitutional.17 Indeed, as explained more fully below,
Windsor also cast doubt on the one case previously thought to recog-
nize congressional standing in a lawsuit with the Executive, INS v.
Chadha.18 And one of the most important opinions that advocates of
legislative standing cite, Coleman v. Miller, is a fractured opinion in
which only four Justices clearly supported the state legislators’
standing to seek an injunction against the Kansas Secretary of
State.19
This Part reviews the doctrine of legislative standing and con-
cludes that the Court will never be able to definitively resolve the
question using the injury-in-fact test. Institutional injuries arising
from interbranch disputes are too abstract and indeterminate for
courts to predictably distinguish between those that support Article
III standing and those that do not. But the opinion in Arizona v.
Arizona may offer a way of avoiding the difficulties of the traditional
injury-in-fact test, at least in a subset of interbranch disputes.
A. Article III Standing and Injuries in Fact
Article III of the Constitution “confines the judicial power of fed-
eral courts to deciding actual ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’”20 The courts
have interpreted this to mean, among other things, that parties in-
voking the power of the federal courts must establish that they have
standing.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated three require-
ments of constitutional standing. First, the party must establish
that it has suffered an “‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and
17. See 133 S. Ct. at 2686 (“An order directing the Treasury to pay money is ‘a real and
immediate economic injury’ .... That the Executive may welcome this order to pay the refund
if it is accompanied by the constitutional ruling it wants does not eliminate the injury to the
national Treasury if payment is made, or to the taxpayer if it is not.” (quoting Hein v.
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 599 (2007))).
18. See id. at 2686-87 (discussing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
19. See 307 U.S. 433, 446 (1939).
20. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
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(b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’”21
Second, “[t]he injury must be ‘fairly’ traceable to the challenged
action.”22 Third, “relief from the injury must be ‘likely’ to follow from
a favorable [judicial] decision.”23 In short, a party wishing to avail
itself of the power of the federal courts must establish that it is
seeking a judicially available “remedy for a personal and tangible
harm.”24 A mere “disagreement, however sharp and acrimonious it
may be, is insufficient by itself to meet Art. III’s requirements.”25
The Court has also said on more than one occasion that its standing
inquiry is “especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the
dispute would force [the Court] to decide whether an action taken
by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was
unconstitutional.”26
In more than two hundred years of push and pull between Con-
gress and the Executive, however, the Court has never definitively
recognized, nor categorically rejected, the standing of Congress to
sue the Executive over the enforcement or defense of federal law.27
The Court came closest to doing so in INS v. Chadha, which for a
time provided a foundation (albeit shaky) for legislative standing.28
But in Windsor, the Court significantly undermined whatever
support Chadha might have once provided.29
21. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted) (first quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984), and then quoting Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (“The injury alleged
must be, for example, ‘distinct and palpable,’ and not ‘abstract’ or ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979), and then quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02
(1983))).
22. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38,
41 (1976)).
23. Id. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 41).
24. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661.
25. Id. (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986)).
26. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665
n.12 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997)).
27. See Stern, supra note 15, at 19.
28. See id. at 19-20.
29. See id. at 22-24.
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B. INS v. Chadha and Legislative Standing to Defend
In Chadha, an alien challenged the constitutionality of a “leg-
islative veto” contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA).30 The INA authorized the Attorney General to suspend the
deportation of an alien otherwise subject to removal on the grounds
of “extreme hardship,” but also authorized either house of Congress
to “veto” the Attorney General’s decision.31 The Executive agreed
with Chadha that the legislative veto was unconstitutional but nev-
ertheless continued to comply with the statute and formally
appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals enjoining the Attor-
ney General from taking any steps to deport Chadha—that is,
complying with the legislative veto—even while arguing in court
that both Chadha and the Court of Appeals were correct that the
legislative veto was unconstitutional.32
The Supreme Court held that “‘the INS was sufficiently aggrieved
by the Court of Appeals decision prohibiting it from taking action it
would otherwise take,’”—deporting Chadha—“regardless of whether
the agency welcomed the judgment.”33 In addition, the Court held
that there was “Art. III adverseness even though the only parties
were the INS and Chadha” because the Court’s decisions would have
“‘real meaning: if we rule for Chadha, he will not be deported; if we
uphold § 244(c)(2), the INS will execute its order and deport him.’”34 
The Chadha holding, however, addressed statutory jurisdiction
of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, not constitutional
standing under Article III.35 Moreover, in a footnote, the Chadha
Court expressly acknowledged that “[i]n addition to meeting the
statutory requisites of § 1252 ... an appeal must present a justiciable
30. See 462 U.S. 919, 923 (1983). 
31. Id. at 923-25 (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 87-885, Sec. 4,
§ 244(a)(1), 76 Stat. 1247, 1248 (1962)). Chadha challenged the legislative veto as a violation
of separation of powers after the House vetoed the Attorney General’s decision to suspend his
deportation. Id. at 928.
32. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013) (discussing Chadha).
33. Id. (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 930). 
34. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 939-40 (quoting Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 419 (9th Cir. 1980),
aff’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). The Ninth Circuit opinion in Chadha was written by then-Judge
Anthony Kennedy. See Chadha, 634 F.2d at 411. Thus, in Windsor, Justice Kennedy was
relying on his own opinion in Chadha. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686.
35. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 929-31, 931 n.6.
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case or controversy under Art. III.”36 The Chadha Court then ex-
plained that “[s]uch a controversy clearly exists ... because of the
presence of the two Houses of Congress as adverse parties.”37 The
Court also opined that Congress is a “proper party to defend” the
constitutionality of a law “when an agency of government, as a de-
fendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs
that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”38 Advocates of
legislative standing cite this language from Chadha.39
The context of these statements, however, raises questions about
their meaning. First, the statements are part of a discussion of
“prudential, as opposed to Art. III,” jurisdictional concerns.40 Thus,
the Court may have merely meant, as the Court later held in Wind-
sor, that the presence of one or both houses of Congress as amicus
parties defending the law’s validity dispelled any prudential con-
cerns with adverseness.41 Moreover, the two cases the Chadha Court
cited in support of the “long held” rule that Congress is the proper
party to defend a law when the Executive does not42—Cheng Fan
Kwok v. INS43 and United States v. Lovett44—stand for nothing of
the kind.45 Congress played no role in Cheng Fan Kwok, nor did the
case involve a law the Executive deemed unconstitutional.46 And in
Lovett, Congress merely appeared as an amicus party.47 
36. See id. at 931 n.6.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 940.
39. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 1, at 597-98, 597 n.105.
40. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940.
41. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686-87 (2013). The Attorney General
argued this to the Supreme Court. See Brief for the United States on the Jurisdictional
Questions at 34-37, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307).
42. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940.
43. 392 U.S. 206 (1968).
44. 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
45. The Attorney General and the amica curiae in Windsor argued this. See Brief for the
United States on the Jurisdictional Questions, supra note 41, at 36-37; Brief for Court-
Appointed Amica Curiae Addressing Jurisdiction at 10-11, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-
307) (distinguishing Lovett and Cheng Fan Kwok from broad language in Chadha).
46. See Cheng Fan Kwok, 392 U.S. at 210 n.9 (noting the Court invited a member of the
Supreme Court Bar to appear and present oral argument as amicus curiae in support of the
judgment below because the Executive agreed with petitioner’s interpretation of the law).
47. See Lovett v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 142, 143 (Ct. Cl. 1945) (“Special counsel
appear in the cases as amici curiae, having been employed to defend the constitutionality of
the disputed section. The special counsel are designated variously in the record as
representing the House, the Congress, the United States.”), aff’d, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
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Second, the single authority the Court cited in support of the idea
that “the presence of the two Houses of Congress as adverse parties”
presented a “justiciable case or controversy”48 also did not involve
Congress, either as a party or amicus, and seems inapposite.49 In
sum, only one of the authorities cited in support of legislative stand-
ing, if that is indeed what the Court was trying to establish,
involved Congress, and that case only involved Congress as an
amicus party, not as a party participant. 
Thus, the only thing clear about Chadha with respect to Article
III standing is that it is not very clear. It is plausible that in order
to dispel any prudential concerns with adverseness the Court was
merely approving congressional defense as amicus of laws the
Executive chooses not to defend.50 This is how the Court in Windsor
appeared to have interpreted this language from Chadha.51
Moreover, if we interpret Chadha, as the majority did in Windsor,
to mean that the Executive’s enforcement of the law and appeal of
adverse judgments provides the federal courts with Article III
jurisdiction even if the Executive agrees that the law is unconstitu-
tional,52 then the Chadha Court’s handling of legislative standing is
effectively rendered dicta. That is, if the Executive’s presence
conferred Article III jurisdiction on the Court in Chadha, as the
48. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931 n.6; see also id. at 940.
49. The Chadha Court cited Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, U.S.
Department of Labor v. Pereni North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297 (1983). See Chadha, 462
U.S. at 931 n.6. In Pereni, the Court addressed whether it had jurisdiction to hear a case in
which the Executive sought review of an administrative decision finding that the Long-
shoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act did not cover an injured construction
worker. See Pereni, 459 U.S. at 302-03; see also Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compen-
sation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2012). The employer argued that the Executive did not have
standing because the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not injure the
Executive; the Executive’s only interest in the case was in furthering a different inter-
pretation of the Act than the one the ALJ rendered. Pereni, 459 U.S. at 301-02. Nevertheless,
the Court held that the injured worker’s presence as a party respondent gave the Court
jurisdiction to consider the merits of the lower court decision. See id. at 304-05. Thus, the case
seemed to have more to do with injury than adverseness.
50. Cf. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940 (noting there were no prudential concerns because briefs
from both houses of Congress were accepted).
51. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686-87 (2013) (suggesting that
Congress’s presence in Chadha dispelled prudential concerns with hearing a nonadversarial
suit).
52. See id.
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Court made clear in Windsor, then the Chadha Court did not need
to address whether the houses of Congress had standing.
C. Legislative Injuries
If Congress is like other parties, then it should be able to estab-
lish Article III standing if it has suffered an injury-in-fact and met
the other requirements of standing. But the only executive action
that the Court has ever recognized as causing an injury to a legis-
lature as an institution is the nullification or invalidation of a
legislature’s vote.53
The most important case concerning congressional standing is
Raines v. Byrd, in which individual members of the House and
Senate filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Line
Item Veto Act.54 The members of Congress argued that the Act upset
the constitutional balance between the President and Congress, and
violated the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment because the President was now free to cancel legisla-
tive appropriations.55 The district court held that the Act’s alleged
dilution of the legislators’ Article I voting power was sufficient to
confer Article III standing.56 But the Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that the members of Congress did not have standing to
challenge the law.57 
53. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821-23 (1997) (“The one case in which we have
upheld standing for legislators (albeit state legislators) claiming an institutional injury is
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).”); see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 (2015) (finding a prospective nullification of the
state legislature’s vote because it would be futile under the state constitution).
54. See 521 U.S. at 813-14. See generally Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110
Stat. 1200 (1996), invalidated by Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
55. Raines, 521 U.S. at 816. In a long line of cases, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had
held that individual members of Congress had standing to challenge actions that affected
their constitutionally prescribed lawmaking powers. See, e.g., Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d
623, 625-28 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 28-29 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated sub
nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d
946, 951-54 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
abrogated by Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999). But see Moore, 733 F.2d
at 956-57 (Scalia, J., concurring in result) (disagreeing with majority’s finding of standing).
56. See Byrd v. Raines, 956 F. Supp. 25, 31 (D.D.C. 1997), vacated, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
57. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 813-14.
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First, the Court explained that the legislators were not “singled
out for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Mem-
bers of their respective bodies.”58 Nor did they claim they were
“deprived of something to which they personally [were] entitled—
such as their seats as Members of Congress after their constituents
elected them.”59 Thus, the case was distinguishable from Powell v.
McCormack, in which Adam Clayton Powell challenged a House
resolution excluding him from taking his seat and depriving him of
his salary.60 Rather, the Raines legislators claimed “that the Act
cause[d] a type of institutional injury (the diminution of legislative
power), which necessarily damages all Members of Congress and
both Houses of Congress equally.”61 
The Court then explained that it had upheld standing for legisla-
tors claiming an institutional injury in only one case—Coleman v.
Miller.62 In Coleman, the Kansas State Senate deadlocked twenty to
twenty on whether to ratify the proposed Child Labor Amendment
to the Federal Constitution.63 Nevertheless, the Lieutenant Gover-
nor, who was also the presiding officer of the state senate, cast a
deciding vote in favor of the amendment.64 After a majority of the
Kansas House of Representatives also voted to ratify the amend-
ment, it was deemed ratified by the State.65 The twenty state sen-
ators who had voted against ratification, along with one additional
state senator and three state house members, brought suit challeng-
ing the ratification on the ground that the Lieutenant Governor was
not entitled to cast the deciding vote in the state senate.66 The
Supreme Court held that the legislators had standing to challenge
58. Id. at 821.
59. Id.
60. See id. 820-21 (discussing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 512-14 (1969)). In
Powell, the Court held that the case presented an Article III case or controversy because the
case was not moot even though Powell was seated in the next Congress. 395 U.S. at 496. The
injury Powell alleged—denial of his seat and salary—was a classic type of common law injury
based on a legal right. See David J. Weiner, Note, The New Law of Legislative Standing, 54
STAN. L. REV. 205, 217 (2001).
61. Raines, 521 U.S. at 821.
62. See id.
63. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 435-36 (1939).
64. Id. at 436.
65. Id. at 436-37.
66. Id. at 436.
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the ratification.67 But the Court in Raines explained that, in the
Coleman case,
if these legislators (who were suing as a bloc) were correct on the
merits, then their votes not to ratify the amendment were de-
prived of all validity .... It is obvious, then, that our holding in
Coleman stands (at most) for the proposition that legislators
whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a
specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative
action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground
that their votes have been completely nullified.68
Although the plaintiffs in Coleman were individual legislators,69
the Court in Raines described their alleged injury as an “institu-
tional” injury to the state senate itself.70 But the Raines Court
refused to extend Coleman by expanding the circumstances in which
the diminution of a legislature’s institutional power would provide
a basis for standing: 
There is a vast difference between the level of vote nullification
at issue in Coleman and the abstract dilution of institutional
legislative power that is alleged here [based on the line-item
veto]. To uphold standing here would require a drastic extension
of Coleman. We are unwilling to take that step.71
 
Thus, the relevant institutional injury in Coleman was that the
secretary of state had “deemed” the amendment ratified notwith-
standing the senate’s alleged failure to approve it.72 The fact that
the line-item veto challenged in Raines might violate Article I of the
67. See id. at 437-38.
68. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 822-23 (1997) (citation omitted).
69. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436-37.
70. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 821 (citing Coleman, 307 U.S. 433). The Court may have recog-
nized standing in the individual senators and the representative rather than requiring the
state senate to bring suit because of the obvious difficulty of obtaining a majority vote to
pursue litigation when the vote on ratification was deadlocked.
71. Id. at 826.
72. Thus, for purposes of legislative standing, the Court does not seem to recognize in-
juries comprising increased probability of harm, such as it has recognized in the beneficiaries
of the regulatory state. See Weiner, supra note 60, at 233-34. Rather, there must be a concrete
injury to their legislative rights. Id.
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Constitution, as indeed the Court later held,73 did not in and of itself
establish a distinct injury to the legislative branch for purposes of
Article III standing.74 No one had invalidated an Act of Congress.75 
D. Is Congress Injured by Executive Enforcement Decisions?
Can the Executive’s enforcement decisions cause an institutional
injury to Congress sufficient to give it legislative standing? There
are at least four ways in which the Executive might enforce a fed-
eral law. First, the Executive might choose not to enforce the law if
it believes the law is unconstitutional.76 This occurs exceedingly
rarely, but is not unheard of.77 Second, the Executive might enforce
but not defend the law because the Executive believes the law is un-
constitutional, but for other reasons believes that it can best meet
its Take Care Clause responsibilities by continuing to enforce the
law until a final judicial decision agrees with the Executive’s con-
stitutional judgment.78 Third, the Executive might choose to enforce
the law but exercise enforcement discretion based on the application
of the law to unforeseen or inappropriate cases, resource con-
straints, or a variety of other reasons, including what the Executive
believes to be the optimal level of enforcement.79 Finally, the
73. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998).
74. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 829-30.
75. Another way to read Raines, however, is that the Court will protect legislators from
executive encroachment on their rights, but not injuries brought on themselves. See id. at 824-
26, 829-30. Congress gave the Executive the line-item veto power, and therefore, in Raines,
the Court would not hear congressional complaints that Congress was injured by its own
actions. Cf. id. No one had invalidated anyone’s votes. See id. at 824. Moreover, the legislators
who brought the constitutional challenge had opposed the line-item veto in the legislative
process and lost. See id. at 814. Perhaps the Court was concerned with opening the floodgates
to suits by congressional sore losers. Cf. id. at 824-30.
76. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 12, at 407 (discussing the presidential nonenforcement
theory).
77. Cf. Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Standing in the Shadow of Popular Sovereignty, 95 B.U.
L. REV. 1869, 1905-07 (2015) (arguing that executive nonenforcement of laws should be rare).
78. See id. at 1914.
79. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 12, at 382-87 (discussing the reasons why the Execu-
tive may exercise enforcement discretion). This includes situations in which the Executive
supports the statutory goals as well as situations in which the Executive is hostile to the
statute’s underlying purpose and desires underenforcement to limit its impact.
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Executive may enforce the law as best it can based on a sincere
interpretation of its statutory mandate.80
The lines between the third and fourth categories are not always
clear. Few laws can be enforced without some enforcement discre-
tion, and interpretation will nearly always require policy judgments
in the absence of clear statutory direction.81 In addition, the second
category—executive enforcement, but not defense—is unlikely to
give rise to legislative standing in the wake of Windsor because the
Court will recognize the standing of the Executive instead.82 There-
fore, this Section considers whether (1) nonenforcement based on
constitutional objections or (2) the exercise of enforcement discretion
or a difference in statutory interpretation causes an injury to
Congress sufficient to support Article III standing under current
doctrine.
1. Nonenforcement Based on Constitutional Objections
If any enforcement decision would cause an injury to Congress,
it would most likely be the decision of the Executive not to enforce
a statutory provision based on constitutional objections. Advocates
of legislative standing argue that such nonenforcement ignores an
act of Congress in a way similar to how the State in Coleman
ignored the legal effect of the state senate’s deadlocked vote.83 On
the other side are those who argue that the Executive’s decision not
to enforce a law based on constitutional objections does not treat the
law as if it had never been enacted; the President is merely looking
to the higher authority of the Constitution.84 The law remains on
the books and the next President may take a different view of its
80. See id. at 402, 404-05 (discussing the Executive’s latitude for enforcement discretion).
81. See id. at 405 (“[T]he Executive may expand and contract its jurisdiction where
Congress has not clearly defined its boundaries.”).
82. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
83. See Opposition of the United States House of Representatives to Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint at 32-33, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp.
3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 14-cv-01967(RMC)).
84. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 507, 535-36 (2012) (asserting that the Faithful Execution Clause gives no
warrant for a claim that unconstitutional laws are not laws); see also Harrison, supra note 1,
at 109 (drawing a distinction between the validity of a law and compliance with and
implementation of the law).
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constitutionality.85 Indeed, the same President might change his
mind and decide to enforce the law, particularly if Congress pun-
ishes the Executive for nonenforcement. If the Executive resumes
enforcement, then a court will—assuming it finds the law constitu-
tional—assist the Executive in its enforcement. By contrast, a court
will reject all efforts to enforce a law that has been repealed or that
the court concludes was never properly enacted.86
Some go further still and argue that Congress’s role in lawmaking
ends where law execution begins.87 The Court’s opinion in Hollings-
worth v. Perry lends some support to this idea.88 In Hollingsworth,
the Court held that a judicial declaration that California Proposition
8, a ballot initiative, was unconstitutional did not injure the official
proponents because the lower court “had not ordered them to do or
refrain from doing anything.”89 Similarly, when a court declares a
federal law unconstitutional, it does not order Congress to do or
refrain from doing anything.90 Indeed, Congress may pass, and has
passed, laws that are unconstitutional under settled Supreme Court
precedents.91
Moreover, the Hollingsworth Court declared that the official
proponents had no “‘direct stake’ in the outcome of their appeal.”92
At that point, their “only interest in having the District Court order
85. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 84, at 536-37 (noting that a President cannot bind
his successors to his enforcement practices).
86. Cf. id. at 532, 536-37.
87. See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint at 13, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015)
(No. 14-cv-01967(RMC)) (“This distinction between the enactment of federal law and the
execution of federal law is critical.... Because Congress plays no direct role in the execution
of federal law and has no continuing or distinct interest or stake in a bill once it becomes a
law, Congress suffers no legally cognizable injury if that law (in Congress’s view) is
improperly administered.”); see also Harrison, supra note 1, at 109-10 (discussing how the
“failure of implementation” does not impair legislative power).
88. See 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
89. Id. at 2662.
90. Cf. Harrison, supra note 1, at 127 (noting that the Court does not literally change a
law when it declares that law unconstitutional).
91. For example, even after the Supreme Court held that the legislative veto was
unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983), Congress continued to include
the legislative device in hundreds of statutes. See William F. Leahy, Recent Development, The
Fate of the Legislative Veto After Chadha, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 168, 174-75 (1984-85) (dis-
cussing cases in which parties sought to maintain the use of the legislative veto).
92. 133 S. Ct. at 2662 (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64
(1997)).
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reversed was to vindicate the constitutional validity of a generally
applicable California law.”93 But as the Court has repeatedly ex-
plained,
[a] litigant “raising only a generally available grievance about
government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him
than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III
case or controversy.”94
The proponents of Proposition 8 might have argued that the in-
validation of the law harmed them “more directly and tangibly”95
than the public at large, because they were the ones who put the
law on the ballot. Or they might have argued that voters are
harmed in a concrete and particular way when a ballot initiative is
declared unconstitutional because it diminishes the voters’ power in
California (unlike at the federal level) as a source of law. Of course,
this is similar to the argument that Congress itself is injured when
a law is declared unconstitutional or the Executive does not fully
enforce that law.96
Is there any difference between the injury to Congress when the
Executive refuses to enforce an act it has passed and the injury to
voters when a court invalidates a ballot measure they have ap-
proved? Both are injured in the sense that the law they made has
been ignored as valid law. Thus, a strong case can be made that if
the Hollingsworth Court rejected the standing of voters to defend a
law they placed on the ballot and approved,97 then it should also
reject the standing of Congress to sue the Executive over its failure
to enforce a congressional statute.
To be sure, the voters of California—though not the official pro-
ponents—represent a much larger group than the members of
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992)).
95. Id.
96. See Opposition of the United States House of Representatives to Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint, supra note 83, at 32-33 (claiming defendants injured the House by
nullifying its vote on the Affordable Care Act).
97. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659 (noting that California voters passed Proposition
8).
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Congress. But in FEC v. Akins, the Court held that an injury in fact
may be widely shared—indeed shared by all citizens of the United
States—yet still satisfy Article III.98 In Akins, a group of voters
alleged an injury based on the Federal Election Commission’s
failure to require certain disclosures of the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) under the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971.99 All voters, not just the plaintiffs, were denied this
information.100 Yet the Court held that “where a harm is concrete,
though widely shared, the Court has found ‘injury in fact.’”101 Thus,
if the plaintiffs in Akins were entitled to standing based on an
injury shared by every eligible voter in the United States—currently
around 220 million people102—then it is hard to see why the propo-
nents of Proposition 8 would be denied standing merely because
their injury was shared by seven million California voters who
approved Proposition 8.103
If the Court is serious about its jurisdictional holding in Hol-
lingsworth, then it is difficult to see how either the judicial invalida-
tion of a law or the Executive’s decision not to enforce a law, much
less the exercise of enforcement discretion, injures Congress any
more than the invalidation of a ballot initiative injures the citizens
who approved it.104 The difference from Coleman is that there is no
dispute about the legal effect of the votes cast by individual leg-
islators, either house of Congress, or Congress as a whole.105 When
the Executive decides not to enforce a law, the legal meaning of
Congress’s vote is not in doubt. Rather, the Executive is choosing
98. See 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998).
99. See id. at 13-14.
100. See id. at 20 (finding that Congress intended to protect voters generally by authorizing
suit).
101. Id. at 24 (citing Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1989)).
102. THOM FILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO VOTES? CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS AND THE
AMERICAN ELECTORATE: 1978-2014, at 3 (2015), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/
library/publications/2015/demo/p20-577.pdf [https://perma.cc/ENP3-A7SQ] (counting 220 mil-
lion citizens over the age of 18). Not every citizen eligible to vote, however, has registered to
vote, which is required before casting a ballot in every state except North Dakota. Id.
103. Cf. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 (noting that the presence of a political forum to redress
asserted issues does not disqualify voters from standing).
104. Cf. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A public law, after
enactment, is not the Senate’s any more than it is the law of any other citizen or group of
citizens in the United States. It is a law of the United States of America.”).
105. Cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939) (stating that the state “senators have
a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes”).
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not to enforce the law based on its view of the law’s constitutional-
ity.
Of course, Hollingsworth may be wrong on this point. It seems
odd to say that those who enact law have no further interest in the
law once it is enacted. Surely lawmaking bodies create law to
achieve certain goals and thereby have an ongoing interest in seeing
those goals accomplished. This is why Congress is vested with
supervisory powers over the executive branch, holds hearings, con-
ducts investigations, demands documents, inquires into various
matters within the jurisdiction of the executive branch, and (ulti-
mately) enacts legislation to shape the activity of the Executive.106
Still, to the extent the Executive has a duty to enforce the law
pursuant to the Take Care Clause,107 this responsibility constitutes
an obligation of the Executive to “the People” who ratified the Con-
stitution, not to a coordinate branch of government created by the
same Constitution.108 Yet even the people are unable to assert an
injury based on the Executive’s failure to enforce the law without
establishing a separate concrete injury of their own.109 Without their
own injury, the people have no more than a generalized grievance,
which is insufficient to establish Article III standing.110 Thus, if the
people to whom the Executive owes a Take Care Clause obligation
to execute the law cannot themselves sue the Executive for breach
of this duty, why should Congress be able to do so?111
106. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 69-70
(2006) (discussing the ways Congress employs its legislative power to oversee administration
of laws).
107. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Those who believe that the President has a constitutional
duty to defend federal laws irrespective of her view of the laws’ constitutionality generally cite
this section of the Constitution. See, e.g., Curt A. Levey & Kenneth A. Klukowski, Take Care
Now: Stare Decisis and the President’s Duty to Defend Acts of Congress, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 377, 381 (2014) (claiming that the Take Care Clause requires the President to uphold
his duty to defend).
108. See Harrison, supra note 1, at 106-07; Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 77, at 1903.
109. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (noting that citizens cannot
assert injuries based on “generalized” grievances (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
149, 160 (1990))).
110. See id.; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984).
111. Indeed, one can imagine the Court pausing before opening the federal courthouse to
Congress whenever Congress believes that the Executive is not enforcing the law appropri-
ately.
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2. Enforcement Discretion
If there are doubts about whether Congress is injured by exec-
utive decisions not to enforce a statutory provision based on consti-
tutional objections, it seems even more unlikely that the Executive’s
implementation of the law, including its exercise of enforcement dis-
cretion, could constitute a nullification of the underlying legislative
act. After all, in such cases, the Executive claims to act pursuant to
statutory authority,112 so it is difficult to argue that the Executive
is nullifying the law.113
Moreover, if the Executive’s interpretation of its discretion under
the law could cause an injury to Congress—under the theory that
nonenforcement in certain circumstances or against certain parties
constitutes a partial or temporary “nullification” of the law—then
the injury would stem from a difference in statutory interpretation
rather than a difference in constitutional views.114 But if mere inter-
pretive disagreements could be the basis for congressional lawsuits,
then such suits would be available in a vast swath of circumstances.
The idea of courts hearing disputes between the Executive and Con-
gress—let alone one house of Congress, a committee, or individual
legislators—over the proper interpretation of a statute whenever
they disagree is too terrible for most to imagine.
Moreover, because the Executive acts pursuant to congressional
statute in these cases, Congress has the power to narrow or elim-
inate any discretion the Executive claims as authority for its action
112. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 12, at 388 (discussing instances in which Congress has
“delegate[d] extra-legislative vetos to the Executive Branch”). Even when underenforcement
is motivated by hostility to the underlying statute, the Executive generally will still claim to
be exercising enforcement discretion if it does not cite a constitutional basis for its actions.
113. But see Opposition of the U.S. House of Representatives to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint, supra note 83, at 32-33 (claiming that the defendants’ rewrite of
section 1513(d) of the Affordable Care Act and section 4980H of the Internal Revenue Code
nullified the law).
114. This assumes good faith on the part of the Executive, but we have no reason to believe
the Executive plays fast and loose when choosing between constitutional objections and
enforcement discretion as a defense to inaction. Enforcement discretion offers the Executive
significant latitude and is generally viewed as more legitimate than nonenforcement based
on constitutional objections. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 12, at 397 (discussing why
enforcement discretion is generally given more latitude than nonenforcement). Accordingly,
the former is much more common than the latter.
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or inaction.115 It seems strange to say that Congress is institution-
ally injured by disagreements with the Executive over the proper
interpretation of the law when Congress has the institutional power
to overrule the Executive. That is, Congress can amend the statute
to eliminate any ambiguity and make clear that its own interpreta-
tion of the statute is the correct one.116
Finally, in many—if not most—cases, the Congress that wrote the
law being interpreted has left the political stage.117 As a result it
may be difficult—if not impossible—to know, in any interpretive
dispute, whether the Executive or the sitting Congress has the
better understanding of the enacting Congress’s statutory intent.
The injury-in-fact test is unlikely ever to provide a predictable
means for determining whether Congress has standing to avail itself
of a federal court to resolve disputes with the Executive. Too many
serious questions remain about whether the Executive’s enforce-
ment decisions cause an institutional injury to Congress sufficient
to support congressional standing.118 The alleged injuries are often
too abstract to say whether the legislature is injured based on any-
thing more than congressional say so. Especially when it comes to
the particular manner in which the Executive enforces the law, the
injury is likely to be in the eye of the beholder—one Congress’s
injury is another Congress’s successful implementation of the law.119
Judge William Fletcher once said, “[i]f we put to one side people
who lie about their states of mind, we should concede that anyone
who claims to be injured is, in fact, injured if she can prove the
115. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985) (“[T]he presumption may be
rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in
exercising its enforcement powers.”); Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 12, at 405 (noting that Con-
gress can amend a law to expand or contract the jurisdiction of executive agencies).
116. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 12, at 404 (discussing Congress’s ability to amend
statutes to limit executive discretion in enforcement).
117. Cf. id. at 387 (“[T]he extra-legislative veto protect[s] the President from conflicts ...
based on legislative bargains struck by enacting coalitions that had left the political stage.”).
118. See Matthew I. Hall, Making Sense of Legislative Standing, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 16
(2016) (“The Court’s legislative standing doctrine is a Rorschach Test—open to multiple
plausible, yet inconsistent, interpretations.”). Professor Hall argues that legislative plaintiffs
should only be able to establish standing when they can point to “a specific prerogative or
power eliminated by the defendant, or threatened with elimination as a result of the
litigation.” Id. at 26.
119. Cf. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 12, at 385-86 (discussing how the Executive’s
enforcement decisions allow it “to juggle ... competing statutory goals and adapt enforcement
priorities to the changing environment”).
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allegations of her complaint.”120 Judge Fletcher criticized the Court’s
standing doctrine for claiming to merely require a neutral “factual”
showing of injury while in fact applying external normative stan-
dards to plaintiffs alleging nontraditional injuries.121 Whether Judge
Fletcher and the other scholars who have criticized the Court’s
standing jurisprudence are right or wrong, standing undeniably
becomes more contested when we move beyond traditional injuries
that we can verify without reference to a plaintiff’s state of mind,
such as monetary loss, physical injuries, and even increased risk
exposure.122 Moreover, although there may be no reason to doubt the
sincerity of most private plaintiffs, as discussed more fully below in
Part II.A.4, there may be reason to doubt the sincerity, and
certainly the constancy, of Congress when it sues the Executive
during times of divided government.
E. Arizona v. Arizona and Equitable Discretion
The Supreme Court returned to the question of legislative
standing at the end of the 2014-2015 Term in Arizona v. Arizona.123
In that case, the Arizona Legislature sought to challenge the con-
stitutionality of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission
(AIRC), which was created by an Arizona ballot initiative amending
the Arizona State Constitution.124 The Arizona Legislature argued
that the federal Elections Clause, which states that “[t]he Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Repre-
sentatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations,”125 vests a state’s representative body with sole
120. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 231 (1988).
121. See id.
122. See generally Shaun Cassin, Comment, Eggshell Minds and Invisible Injuries: Can
Neuroscience Challenge Longstanding Treatment of Tort Injuries?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 929, 933
(2013) (noting that the existence of a physical injury is easier to prove than other kinds of
harms).
123. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2658-59 (2015).
124. See id. at 2658.
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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authority—absent congressional action—“to prescribe ... regulations
... for congressional redistricting.”126
A five-Justice majority held that the Arizona Legislature had
standing to bring the suit and went on to address the merits of the
case, ultimately deciding that the Elections Clause permitted the
use of a ballot initiative as part of a state’s lawmaking power to
structure the process for designing congressional districts.127 First,
the majority explained that the question of standing in no way
depended on the merits of the claim.128 Thus, although the Court
rejected the argument that the Arizona Legislature had the “ex-
clusive, constitutionally guarded role it assert[ed],” it nevertheless
held that the Legislature had stated a concrete injury.129
Second, analogizing to Coleman, the Court held that the prospec-
tive nullification of any vote to adopt a redistricting plan injured the
Arizona Legislature.130 Such nullification would occur because the
Arizona Constitution bans any effort by the Legislature to under-
mine the purposes of a citizen initiative.131 The AIRC and the
United States, as an amicus party, argued that there could be no
injury until the Legislature took a “specific legislative act that
would have taken effect but for Proposition 106”132 or “the Arizona
Secretary of State refuse[d] to implement a competing redistricting
plan passed by the Legislature.”133 Under this theory, the injury was
“premature,” or “too ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’ to establish stand-
ing.”134 Clearly thinking ahead to the House of Representative’s
126. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2673 (alterations in original) (quoting Reply Brief
for Appellant at 30, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 13-1314)).
127. See id. at 2659. Four Justices dissented on the merits, but two of the dissenters, Chief
Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, neither addressed the standing question nor
joined the dissenting opinions of Justices Antonin Scalia or Clarence Thomas that did. See id.
at 2677-78 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2694-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the
doctrine of standing in a decision that only Justice Thomas joined); id. at 2697, 2699 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (concurring “with Justice Scalia that the Arizona Legislature lacks Article III
standing to assert an institutional injury against another entity of state government”).
128. See id. at 2663 (majority opinion).
129. Id. at 2663, 2665-66.
130. See id. at 2665.
131. See id. at 2664.
132. Id. at 2663 (quoting Brief for Appellees Arizona Independent Redistricting Com-
mission, et al. at 20, Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 13-1314)).
133. Id. (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 14-17,
Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 13-1314)).
134. Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
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“usurpation” argument in House v. Burwell,135 the United States
(read executive branch) claimed that the Arizona Legislature’s 
real complaint ... is not that its power to enact legislation has
been “usurped,” but rather the distinct claim that any redistrict-
ing legislation it enacts will be ignored by state officials. That is,
the claim of injury here is based on a predicted failure of state
officials to enforce a district map adopted by the legislature, not
on any regulation of the legislature’s own primary conduct in
enacting such legislation.136
Consequently, the Department of Justice (DOJ) contended, the
Arizona Legislature’s alleged injury was not “actual” or “imminent,”
as the Court has said Article III requires.137 And unless the Arizona
Legislature enacted its own redistricting plan that the Arizona
Secretary of State refused to enforce, its complaint was no more
than a generalized grievance that the law was not being followed,
which the Court has consistently held is insufficient to establish
Article III standing.138
The Court rejected these arguments, explaining that “the Legis-
lature’s passage of a competing plan and submission of that plan to
the Secretary of State [would be] unavailing.”139 The Court cited
provisions of the Arizona Constitution that (1) prohibit the Leg-
islature from adopting measures that supersede an initiative in
whole or in part and do not further the purposes of the initiative;
and (2) require the Secretary of State to implement the redistrict-
ing plan of the Commission and no other.140 Therefore, the Court
seemed to say, the Legislature had no nonjudicial remedy because
135. See Opposition of the United States House of Representatives to Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss the Complaint, supra note 83, at 4 (claiming that the Congress’s power to limit the
Executive is only effective if that power can be enforced through the courts). Indeed, the
Department of Justice’s brief devoted considerable space discussing lawsuits by Congress
against the President, while acknowledging that they were “not directly applicable here.”
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 19, Ariz. State
Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 13-1314).
136. Brief for the United States, supra note 135, at 11.
137. See id. at 14 (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2541
(2014)).
138. See id. at 13.
139. See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2663.
140. Id. at 2664.
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any of the actions that the Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission and the DOJ suggested would be futile.141 Or put
differently, the Arizona Legislature had exhausted its legislative
remedies.
Of course, there were likely other nonjudicial remedies available
to the Arizona Legislature besides passing a competing redistricting
plan. As the Commission pointed out, the Arizona Legislature has
“the power to refer constitutional amendments to the People of
Arizona.”142 Therefore, the Commission argued, the Legislature
could have proposed “an initiative that would eliminate the Com-
mission entirely—the voters of Arizona have previously repealed
other constitutional amendments just years after their initial pas-
sage.”143 The Court did not address these arguments. Perhaps the
Court did not believe it would be lawful for the Legislature to
pursue such a course given the prohibition on attempts by the
Legislature to supersede an initiative. But the Court did not delve
into the meaning of the Arizona Constitution,144 and it may be more
appropriate to read the provision as merely precluding statutory
acts that themselves undermine a referendum rather than a
proposal that the electorate repeal its own initiative.
Alternatively, the Court may have felt the power of the Legisla-
ture to propose repeals was irrelevant because the citizens might
reject the Legislature’s proposal, and its loss of redistricting power
would remain uncured. This would be an exhaustion principle
without much bite. Private parties that must exhaust their adminis-
trative remedies before seeking relief in federal court do not have
the power to obtain the remedy they seek from the administrative
forum; they only have the possibility of obtaining it.145 The Arizona
Legislature certainly did not attempt to obtain a remedy in a
nonjudicial forum—for example, by submitting its proposal to the
141. See id. at 2663-64 (discussing why the Legislature could not take the actions suggested
by the Commission and the DOJ).
142. Brief for Appellees Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, et al. at 9, Ariz.
State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (No. 13-1314) (citing ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1, cl. 15;
id. art. XXI, § 1).
143. See id. at 10.
144. See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2664 (stating the provisions of the Arizona
Constitution but not critically analyzing their meaning).
145. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J.).
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electorate—and we can only speculate on whether such an attempt
would have been futile.146
Of course at the federal level, Congress does have the power to
overrule the Executive in legislative disputes.147 If Congress wants
to override a presidential veto, it has the power to do so with suffi-
cient political will.148 In addition, no mechanisms at the federal level
exist by which the people can directly trump an act of Congress.149
Therefore, regardless of the precise contours of the Legislative Ex-
haustion principle that we might glean from Arizona v. Arizona, at
the federal level the principle would seem to bar Congress from
bringing suits that seek what Congress could achieve through
legislative means.150
To be clear, the Court expressly disclaimed the relevance of its
opinion to the standing of Congress to sue the Executive.151 But the
Court distinguished such suits from the Arizona Legislature’s action
because the standing analysis would be more, not less, rigorous
given the separation of powers concerns raised by congressional
suits against the President. Therefore, although we might be wary
of relying upon Arizona v. Arizona to establish congressional
standing, it is worth considering how the Court’s reasoning might
be used to bar congressional lawsuits, even without the heightened
separation of powers concerns.
Justice Ginsburg’s approach, at least as articulated here, bears
some resemblance to the “equitable discretion” doctrine the D.C.
Circuit used to review legislator lawsuits when then-Judge Gins-
burg sat on the D.C. Circuit.152 The doctrine was one of several tools
146. See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2663-64.
147. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (outlining the legislative override of executive vetoes).
148. See id.
149. The Article V amendment process begins in Congress or the state legislatures and
ends in the state legislatures or ratifying conventions called for that purpose. See U.S. CONST.
art. V.
150. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997) (concluding that members of
Congress who lacked Article III standing had other legislative means to pursue a remedy to
their claim).
151. Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2665 n.12.
152. See Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also
Melcher v. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561, 562-64 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (approving the
“equitable discretion” principle while disapproving dicta in Riegle suggesting that the court
should also consider whether a private plaintiff is available); Moore v. U.S. House of
Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[A]ppellants’ dispute ... is primarily a
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the court developed to handle an onslaught of legislator lawsuits
beginning in the 1970s.153 Under equitable discretion, the D.C. Cir-
cuit dismissed suits by legislative plaintiffs who might otherwise
have Article III standing when the “congressional plaintiff could
obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators through the
enactment, repeal, or amendment of a statute.”154 The D.C. Circuit
rested the principle on separation of powers concerns.155
The doctrine fell into disuse after the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Raines v. Byrd.156 The D.C. Circuit had used the doctrine in suits in
which legislators claimed institutional injuries to Congress and
themselves as individual members of Congress stemming from
executive actions.157 But once the Raines Court held that such
claims did not state an injury under Article III absent nullification
of the validity of their votes,158 the D.C. Circuit no longer needed to
use equitable discretion to dismiss suits by legislative plaintiffs
who might otherwise have standing. Following Raines, the D.C.
Circuit began holding that such plaintiffs did not have Article III
standing and, consequently, never reached the question of equitable
discretion.159
controversy with other members of Congress.”). The “equitable discretion” doctrine was
sometimes called “remedial discretion.” See, e.g., id. at 954.
153. See Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“A great upsurge in this type
of lawsuit began during the Vietnam War era, when members of Congress, frustrated with
what they perceived as the failures of this country’s Southeast Asian foreign and military
policy, filed suit to declare unlawful various executive actions in pursuit of that policy.”),
abrogated by Chenowith v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
154. See Riegle, 656 F.2d at 881.
155. See id. at 882.
156. See 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997) (holding that “individual members of Congress [did] not
have a sufficient ‘personal stake’ in the dispute” and therefore could not demonstrate an
injury sufficient to establish Article III standing).
157. See, e.g., Gregg, 771 F.2d at 543 (noting that equitable discretion was typically applied
when individual members of Congress challenged executive actions).
158. See supra Part I.C.
159. Interestingly, Judge Rosemary Collyer did not address equitable discretion in her
opinion in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, despite the fact that the government
advanced the argument in its briefs. See 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015); Defendants’ Mem-
orandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, supra note 87, at 25-26. See
also infra Part III.D for a discussion of House v. Burwell. Equitable discretion arguably
remains good law in the D.C. Circuit, which applied the doctrine in a closely analogous case
involving legislators who challenged an executive order as usurping their constitutional
authority. See Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“More to the point,
it is exactly the position taken by the Representatives here: Their injury, they say, is the
result of the President’s successful effort ‘to usurp Congressional authority by implementing
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Even prior to Raines, judges on the D.C. Circuit who never
believed legislator lawsuits constituted Article III cases or contro-
versies had no use for the doctrine.160 Indeed then-D.C. Circuit
Judge Antonin Scalia was a particular critic, not because he be-
lieved legislators had Article III standing to resolve interbranch
disputes in the courts, but because he feared that the courts would
exercise their “discretion” to hear such claims.161
The concern with the prudential aspect of equitable discretion
may be more acute today, inasmuch as the Court has suggested that
there is no longer any room for prudential standing.162 But it is easy
to cast Legislative Exhaustion as an Article III prerequisite to ju-
dicial review, rather than as a prudential doctrine. The Court might
hold that Congress cannot establish an injury in fact for purposes
of Article III if it has legislative means of curing the injury.163 The
a program, for which [he] has no constitutional authority, in a manner contrary to the
Constitution.’ Applying Moore, this court presumably would have found that injury sufficient
to satisfy the standing requirement; after Raines, however, we cannot. Raines notwith-
standing, Moore and Kennedy may remain good law, in part, but not in any way that is helpful
to the plaintiff Representatives. Whatever Moore gives the Representatives under the rubric
of standing, it takes away as a matter of equitable discretion. It is uncontested that the
Congress could terminate the AHRI were a sufficient number in each House so inclined.
Because the parties’ dispute is therefore fully susceptible to political resolution, we would,
applying Moore, dismiss the complaint to avoid ‘meddl[ing] in the internal affairs of the
legislative branch.’ Applying Raines, we would reach the same conclusion. Raines, therefore,
may not overrule Moore so much as require us to merge our separation of powers and
standing analyses.” (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Moore v. U.S. House
of Representatives, 753 F.2d 946, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1984), abrogated by Chenowith, 181 F.3d
112)). In addition, in House v. Burwell, Judge Collyer did not mention Harrington v. Bush, 553
F.2d 190, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1977), which rejected the standing of a Representative to bring a
nearly identical misuse of appropriations claim. See generally House v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp.
3d 53.
160. See Moore, 733 F.2d at 956-61 (Scalia, J., concurring); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d
1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring); Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1177-
85 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring).
161. Moore, 733 F.2d at 963 (although “remedial discretion ... may produce judicial absten-
tion it will not necessarily do so. The court will proceed to consider, case by case, whether its
involvement would ‘not serve a useful purpose.’” (quoting id. at 955 (majority opinion))).
162. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388
(2014) (holding that a court “cannot limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely
because ‘prudence’ dictates”).
163. The D.C. Circuit suggested as much in Chenoweth v. Clinton when it remarked that
“Raines ... may not overrule [equitable discretion] so much as require us to merge our
separation of powers and standing analyses.” 181 F.3d at 116. The Supreme Court might also
find redressabilty problems when Congress sues over the meaning of a statute because at any
time a subsequent Congress could overrule the Court by amending the statute. Cf. Allen v.
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separation of powers principle that undergirds both Raines and the
discomfort with equitable discretion is that the federal courts were
not designed to preside over disputes between the political
branches.164 Such lawsuits threaten to both raise the Court above its
pay grade and undermine the political process.165 Legislative
Exhaustion is consistent with this separation of powers concern.
Moreover, these are not mere throwaway lines. As the next Part
demonstrates, legislative efforts to confront the Executive are
central to the engine the Framers designed to drive our political
system.
II. INTERBRANCH CONFLICT IN THE DELIBERATIVE REPUBLIC
Interbranch disputes are not an anomaly in our governmental
system; they are part of its institutional design. The Framers in-
tended the branches to “compete” with one another for the people’s
affections,166 while guarding against “encroachments” and “inva-
sions” of “the weaker departments” by “the stronger.”167 Although
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757-58 (1984) (noting how a judicial order might not redress the alleged
injury due to the responses of third parties), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377.
164. Compare Moore, 733 F.2d at 959 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]e sit here neither to
supervise the internal workings of the executive and legislative branches nor to umpire
disputes between those branches regarding their respective powers.”), with Raines v. Byrd,
521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997) (“[O]ur standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reach-
ing the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an action taken by one of the
other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.”).
165. See, e.g., Raines, 521 U.S. at 824, 829; Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring) (“The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation
of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitu-
tional impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups or even individual Members of
Congress to seek judicial resolution of issues before the normal political process has the
opportunity to resolve the conflict.”); id. at 998 (“It cannot be said that either the Senate or
the House has rejected the President’s claim. If the Congress chooses not to confront the
President, it is not our task to do so.”).
166. Professor Todd E. Pettys uses this expression to describe the relationship between the
state and federal governments in Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection:
Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 336 (2003). Professor Pettys
borrowed the concept from Madison’s description of how the state and federal governments
would compete in THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 239 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
But this idea of competing for the people’s affections also describes how the Framers imagined
the different branches of the federal government functioning. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note
77, at 1888.
167. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 166, at 256-57 (James Madison).
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this martial language might suggest interbranch conflicts cause
the kinds of “injuries” that would support Article III standing,168
there are at least two reasons for doubt. First, the Framers sought
to provide the branches with their own tools for “settling the
boundaries between [the branches’] respective powers.”169 Individual
citizens, by contrast, have fewer options for remedying injuries
caused by the government.170 Second, the Framers viewed inter-
branch competition as a means of promoting enhanced deliberation
about controversial government policies.171 Accordingly, after re-
viewing the relationship of interbranch conflicts as to how the
Framers expected the new Republic to function, this Part examines
each tool that Congress can use to check the Executive and its
deliberative potential.
A. The Framers’ Conception of Republican Government
The Framers of the Constitution created a new political form—a
deliberative democratic republic.172 The new Republic was a repre-
sentative, rather than a direct democracy; the representatives were
charged with refining the views of the people through deliberation
over the public good; and the government was structured to en-
courage such deliberation, particularly when the people and their
representatives were divided over government policy.
168. To be sure, the Framers were much more concerned with encroachments by Congress
on the Executive. See id. NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (“In republican government, the leg-
islative authority necessarily predominates.”). But the Framers did not think this was the
only quarter from which constitutional violations might arise, and with the growth of
executive power since the Founding, it is not difficult to imagine that the greater threat might
now come from elsewhere. But see Beermann, supra note 106, at 64-65 (noting that Congress’s
role in administrating laws has been examined much less following Executive Order 12,291).
169. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 166, at 257 (James Madison). According to
Thomas Jefferson, “[T]he powers of government should be so divided and balanced among
several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being
effectually checked and restrained by the others.” Id. NO. 48, at 254 (James Madison) (quoting
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 129 (J.W. Randolph ed., 1853)).
170. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) (describing the limited
circumstances in which individuals can bring a civil lawsuit against the United States as a
defendant).
171. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 77, at 1890-91.
172. See id. at 1888-90.
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1. A Representative Republic
The first sentence of the Constitution proclaimed that all sover-
eignty in the American Republic rested with “We the People.”173
Whereas the Framers’ English forebears had located sovereignty in
the government—first in the Monarchy, then in Parliament174—the
Americans declared that the People retained their sovereignty, and
the government would merely act as their agents.175
Nevertheless, the Framers created a representative rather than
a direct democracy. The Framers were alarmed by an “excess of
democracy” and “democratic despotism” during the post-Revolu-
tionary period, when the people claimed the authority to direct their
elected leaders how to vote, ignored laws they did not like, and
threatened traditional property rights.176 Imagining themselves the
natural leaders of the new American Republic, the Framers thought
the people did not always “reason right about the means of promot-
ing” the public good.177
Accordingly, the Framers constructed a democracy in which the
elected representatives are not agents of the people in the tradition-
al principal-agent sense of the word;178 they do not merely vote the
will of their constituencies.179 In the new Republic, the elected gov-
ernment would
173. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
174. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 77, at 1873, 1880.
175. To be sure, popular sovereignty was a legal fiction. See Joseph M. Bessette,
Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government, in HOW
DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 102, 103-04 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra
eds., 1980). Moreover, when the Framers talked about the People, they imagined a narrow
group of white, propertied men, led by an even smaller group of men they deemed the natural
leaders of American society. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 77, at 1873 & n.13. But such quasi-
aristocratic notions proved elusive, and over the past two centuries more and more people
have been able to claim the full rights and privileges of citizenship. See, e.g., id.
176. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 409,
484 (1998) (noting that, in the 1780s, giving too much power to the people was leading to
“democratic despotism” and tyranny at the hands of the public). See generally EDMUND S.
MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA 275-77 (1988).
177. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, supra note 166, at 362 (Alexander Hamilton).
178. See FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, THE FIRST CONGRESS: HOW JAMES MADISON, GEORGE
WASHINGTON, AND A GROUP OF EXTRAORDINARY MEN INVENTED THE GOVERNMENT 19 (2016).
179. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 77, at 1888-89.
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refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through
the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best
discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism
and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary
or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well
happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives
of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if
pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the pur-
pose.180
The Framers believed that legislative deliberation by informed
leaders would allow judgment and reason to prevail over private
interests, resulting in legislation for the public good.181 Therefore,
the Framers sought to establish a democracy in which the people’s
representatives would deliberate using “reasoning on the merits of
public policy.”182
2. The Nature of Political Deliberation
Professor Joseph M. Bessette described three fundamental com-
ponents of deliberation: information, argument, and persuasion.183
First, the people’s representatives need facts and information about
social, economic, or political problems and opportunities that might
be appropriate objects of government policy, the different policies
that might be applied, and the likely impact of different courses of
180. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 166, at 51 (James Madison); see also id. NO. 57,
at 290 (James Madison) (“The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to
obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the
common good of the society.”); id. NO. 71, at 362 (Alexander Hamilton) (“When occasions
present themselves, in which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclina-
tions, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those
interests, to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity
for more cool and sedate reflection.”). In line with this view, when Congress drafted the First
Amendment it enshrined the right of the people to “petition,” but not to “instruct,” their
representatives. Maggie McKinley, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131,
1147 (2016).
181. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31-32
(1985); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 57-60 (1990).
182. BESSETTE, supra note 12, at 46.
183. See id. at 46-53.
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action.184 The political branches are equipped with a plethora of
information-gathering tools to provide the factual fuel necessary for
legislative deliberation.185 The Constitution requires that members
of Congress be residents of their congressional districts or states,186
so that they can bring their knowledge of the experiences and needs
of their constituents to bear in national debates.187 The Constitution
also directs the President to “give ... Congress Information of the
State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such
Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”188 Moreover,
since the Founding, Congress has developed a robust information-
gathering capacity based on the committee system within each
house and congressional agencies created to “generate and analyze
information for policy purposes.”189
The second component of deliberation is argument connecting
information and goals to produce policies.190 This is the heart of
deliberation and the focus of much activity within the halls of
Congress, the White House, the executive branch, and the states. It
involves arguments about both appropriate policy goals—for ex-
ample, universal access to health care—and different means of
achieving them—for example, a national health insurance program
or a free-market system.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, deliberation involves
persuasion.191 The Framers imagined legislative deliberation as
potentially transformative, creating an opportunity for the type of
free and open exchange that can change minds in a democratic
society.192 According to Professor Cass Sunstein “this conception
184. Id. at 49-51.
185. Id. at 50.
186. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
187. Bessette, supra note 175, at 107-08; Alfred F. Young, Conservatives, the Constitution,
and the “Spirit of Accommodation,” in HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION?, supra note
175, at 117, 140-41.
188. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
189. BESSETTE, supra note 12, at 50. These include the Congressional Research Service, the
General Accounting Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Office of Technology
Assessment. See id. Notwithstanding complaints about excessive partisanship among our
politicians, these agencies have remained remarkably independent of partisan politics in their
information gathering and analysis. 
190. Id. at 51.
191. Id. at 52-53. 
192. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 187-89
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reflects a belief that debate and discussion help to reveal that some
values are superior to others. Denying that decisions about values
are merely matters of taste, the republican view assumes that
‘practical reason’ can be used to settle social issues.”193 Therefore,
representatives do not make arguments based on information
merely to stake out positions (or posture) or aggregate the opinions
of their constituencies. Rather, they engage in a process of persua-
sion, reconsideration, adjustment, and compromise, in which they
refine policy goals and means to produce laws better designed to
advance the public interest.
3. Deliberation-Forcing Design
The Framers not only expected the national legislature to be
composed of men with better powers of reasoning and under-
standing of the public good, but they also structured the national
political institutions in such a way as to encourage policies in the
public interest and discourage the enactment of bad laws, par-
ticularly when there was not a clear consensus about whether a
policy was in the public interest.194
First, they structured the political branches to bring diverse
views to bear on policy discussions.195 Each of our three national
political institutions—the House, the Senate, and the President—
represents a different set of constituencies.196 Although the Framers
believed in the power of reasoning to produce an objective public
good, they also understood that politicians would respond to the
particular demands of their constituencies and bring their inter-
ests and experiences to bear in national debates.197 The House
members would represent the most cohesive constituencies by vir-
tue of their relatively small size and would be most likely to respond
to their desires because they face reelection most often.198 Senators
(1997); HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE ENDS
OF POLICY 90-93, 244-45 (2002).
193. See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 31-32.
194. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 77, at 1889-91. And the people’s electoral power would




198. See BESSETTE, supra note 12, at 20-21. By the standards of the day, however, the two-
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(originally elected by the state legislatures) would represent broad-
er state interests and would be less likely to be captured by shifting
public moods or passions due to their six-year terms.199 Meanwhile,
the President and Vice President would represent a national
perspective, or at least the perspective of a national majority coa-
lition.200
Second, the Framers ratcheted up the procedural hurdles for
passing controversial policies with bicameralism, presentment, and
the President’s Article I veto power.201 The House and the Senate,
representing their different interests and with different time ho-
rizons, would both have to agree to the passage of any law.202 To the
extent they disagreed in any way, they would have to iron out the
differences and vote on an identical bill, encouraging additional
deliberation.203 Moreover, the limited veto power of the President
would encourage more deliberation than either an absolute veto or
no veto at all.204 The limited veto would invite Congress to debate
whether to accommodate the President’s objections, work towards
a negotiated compromise, or stick to its original policy and over-
ride the veto.205 An absolute veto would give the legislature fewer
options, and no veto would eliminate the need to ever have an ad-
ditional layer of deliberation.206 The overarching goal of this
structure was to prevent the passage of “bad laws” by enhancing
deliberation about controversial policies.207
year term for representatives was quite long, and the size of their constituencies quite large.
The members of the “people’s house” of the new Republic served terms at least “twice as long
as the popular [legislative] branches in every ... state but South Carolina.” Id. at 25.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 232.
201. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
202. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
203. See id.
204. See SPITZER, supra note 12, at 19.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 11-12.
207. See id. at 16-17.
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4. Separation of Parties, Not Powers208
Professors Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes argue that today
the actual competition in our government occurs between political
parties, not the branches of government.209 Thus, “the degree and
kind of competition between the legislative and executive branches
vary significantly, and may all but disappear, depending on wheth-
er the House, Senate, and presidency are divided or unified by
political party.”210 In times of divided government, interbranch
conflict will function in much the way the Framers imagined, with
ambition counteracting ambition, and the deliberation that civic
republicanism imagines, even if the engine doing the work is party
competition, rather than institutional conflict between the political
branches, which merely serve as the vehicles for the parties.211 But
in times of unified government, little competition will persist
between the legislative and executive branches.212 As a result,
“smaller partisan majorities will be able to effect major policy
change without the full range of checks and balances that are
supposed to divide and diffuse power in the Madisonian system.”213
Consequently, there is a risk that unified government will be “too
efficacious and ideologically aggressive.”214
Thus, the emergence of parties does not undermine the civic re-
publican ideal of deliberation at all times. When government is
divided, the competition between the parties will look much like
the competition between the branches that the Framers imag-
ined.215 It is only during times of unified government that we may
need to think of other mechanisms to encourage civic republican
208. This Part takes its name from Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of
Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006). 
209. See id. at 2315; see also James A. Gardner, Democracy Without a Net? Separation of
Powers and the Idea of Self-Sustaining Constitutional Constraints on Undemocratic Behavior,
79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 293, 308 (2005) (“[C]onstitutional actors in a democracy are no less
interested in self-aggrandizement than the Framers believed; it is just that they must
aggrandize themselves very differently in a democratic form of government than in a monar-
chical one.”).
210. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 208, at 2315.
211. Id. at 2329-30.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2338.
214. Id. at 2339.
215. Id. at 2327.
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deliberation.216 Because interbranch disputes will typically arise
during times of divided government, separation of parties suggests
that usually the courts will not need to play a deliberation-forcing
role in such disputes.217 
B. Deliberation and Interbranch Conflict
Congress has a variety of ways in which it can check or punish
the Executive when it does not like the Executive’s enforcement or
defense of federal law.218 Indeed, it is for this reason that many of
those who oppose legislative standing see no need for it.219 But not
all congressional responses are likely to produce deliberation on the
merits of the policy in dispute. This Section examines each congres-
sional tool in terms of its deliberative benefits. It concludes that
when the Executive is acting pursuant to statutory authority, Con-
gress has a variety of tools that will produce greater deliberation on
the merits of government policy than legislative lawsuits. But when
the Executive refuses to enforce a law based on constitutional ob-
jections, Congress has fewer deliberation-producing options.
1. Legislative Action
If Congress disagrees with the Executive’s interpretation of its
statutory obligations, Congress has the power to amend the statute
to clarify or eliminate the Executive’s discretion.220 We should not
216. To address this danger, Professors Levinson and Pildes suggest a variety of ways in
which courts might encourage greater deliberation during times of unified government. For
example, courts might be more generous in construing statutes in support of executive author-
ity in times of divided government and less generous in times of unified government. Id. at
2354. By contrast, during times of divided government, “partisan conflict and competition
between the political branches may reduce the need for an external check.” Id.
217. Id. at 2367-68.
218. See Beermann, supra note 106, at 67-68.
219. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2704-05 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“If majorities in both Houses of Congress care enough about the matter, they have
available innumerable ways to compel executive action without a lawsuit.”); Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[W]e are asked to settle a
dispute between coequal branches of our Government, each of which has resources available
to protect and assert its interests, resources not available to private litigants outside the
judicial forum.”).
220. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 12, at 395.
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underestimate Congress’s institutional power. Few areas of public
policy exist in which the President has constitutional authority to
act contrary to a congressional statute.221 Most of the executive
actions that members of Congress complain about involve interpre-
tations of “[v]ague, general, or ambiguous statutes” with broad, and
sometimes conflicting, mandates.222 Since the decline of the nondel-
egation doctrine,223 the Court has done little to police congressional
delegations of authority to pursue such broad and undefined goals
as the “public convenience, interest, or necessity,”224 “public
health,”225 or “safe or healthful employment and places of employ-
ment.”226 At the same time, the Court has given the Executive a long
leash for implementing such statutes.227 Most notably, the Court
often has deferred to reasonable interpretations of ambiguous
statutes under the Chevron doctrine,228 and has granted the Ex-
ecutive substantial enforcement discretion, allowing the Executive
221. See Beermann, supra note 106, at 72. A few of the most prominent examples are the
President’s discretion over whether to receive Ambassadors, Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v.
Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2087 (2015) (“The formal act of recognition is an executive power that
Congress may not qualify.”), and the pardon power, Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 487-88
(1927). There is some debate over whether the Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress
to place restrictions on the exercise of presidential powers even when they are pursuant to the
President’s constitutionally assigned powers rather than pursuant to federal law. Beermann,
supra note 106, at 76.
222. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1676 (1975).
223. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (“In the history of the
Court we have found the requisite ‘intelligible principle’ lacking in only two statutes, one of
which provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which
conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard
than stimulating the economy by assuring ‘fair competition.’” (citing Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)));
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201,
246 (“The congressional nondelegation doctrine had its last good year in 1935 (and perhaps
its first good year then as well).”); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?,
98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 330 (1999) (“The Old Nondelegation Doctrine: One Good Year, Two
Hundred and Two Bad Years”).
224. Communications Act of 1934 § 303, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2012).
225. Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012).
226. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (2012).
227. See Beermann, supra note 106, at 78.
228. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
But see King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (“In extraordinary cases, however,
there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit
delegation.” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000))).
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to stay its hand even when it comes to activity that was clearly pro-
hibited under the statute.229 Nevertheless, Congress retains the
power to be clearer and more specific in its mandates, thereby
narrowing the Executive’s discretion in these areas: “When
Congress legislates with precision, the President and other admin-
istrative officials may have little discretion in the execution of the
law.”230
For example, after the Secretary of Health and Human Services
interpreted “miner” as used in the Black Lung Benefits Title of the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 to mean an
“individual who is working or has worked as an employee”—thus
excluding self-employed miners231—Congress responded by clarify-
ing the Act’s definition of “miner” to include self-employed miners.232
The Secretary acknowledged that it had to change its own interpre-
tation of the law as a result of the congressional action.233 Similarly,
when the Secretary of Transportation promulgated a motor vehicle
safety standard requiring a lock on automobile ignitions that would
not unlock until the automobile’s seatbelts were fastened,234 the
American people complained to their representatives and Congress
229. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985).
230. Beermann, supra note 106, at 71-72.
231. See Moore v. Harris, 623 F.2d 908, 911 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(j)
(1979)).
232. The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, § 2(b), 92 Stat. 95,
95 (1978) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 902 (2012)) states:
The term “miner” means any individual who works or has worked in or around
a coal mine or coal preparation facility in the extraction or preparation of coal.
Such term also includes an individual who works or has worked in coal mine
construction or transportation in or around a coal mine, to the extent such
individual was exposed to coal dust as a result of such employment.
See also H.R. REP. NO. 95-864, at 15 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
308, 310 (“The Senate amendment modified the definition to include all self-employed
miners.”).
233. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.1(d) (2016) (“The Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977 contains
a number of significant amendments to the Act’s standards for determining eligibility for
benefits. Among these are ... [a] provision which defines ‘miner’ to include any person who
works or has worked in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility, and in coal mine
construction or coal transportation under certain circumstances.”); Moore, 623 F.2d at 913
(“The Secretary fully accepts that, under the current language of the Black Lung Benefits Act,
self-employment in a coal mine counts toward the definitions of ‘miner’ and ‘pneumoconiosis’
and toward the presumptions.”).
234. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 37 Fed. Reg. 3911, 3911-12 (proposed
Feb. 24, 1972), withdrawn, 39 Fed. Reg. 38,380 (Oct. 31, 1974).
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passed the Motor Vehicle and School Bus Safety Amendments of
1974, which (1) prohibited the Department of Transportation from
requiring interlocks and (2) required future passive restraint
regulations to first be cleared by Congress.235 The Ford Administra-
tion then formally withdrew the interlock regulations.236
Congress can also limit an agency’s enforcement discretion “either
by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an
agency’s power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pur-
sue.”237 In Heckler v. Chaney, the Court contrasted the Food and
Drug Administration’s general enforcement policy under the Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act with the Secretary of Labor’s enforcement
obligations under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (LMRDA).238 The LMRDA provided that upon the filing of a
complaint by a union member, “[t]he Secretary shall investigate
such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a
violation ... has occurred ... he shall ... bring a civil action.”239 If a
statute clearly requires the agency to bring an enforcement action
under certain specified conditions, then a federal court will enforce
the congressional command.
Thus, in almost every conflict between Congress and the ex-
ecutive branch over the Executive’s obligations under a statute,
Congress has the power to enforce its view through statutory
amendments.240
Such legislative efforts to make statutes more precise and spe-
cific are the strongest form of deliberative activity in which
Congress can engage. Such deliberation moves beyond broad policy
goals, such as clean air or public health, and grapples with how
different policy responses might accomplish these goals, their fea-
sibility, costs, and collateral consequences. Congress must use its
235. Pub. L. No. 93-492, § 109, 88 Stat. 1470, 1482-84 (1974) (repealed 1994). Congress
could veto the regulations by concurrent resolution—a two-house legislative veto, which would
now almost certainly be unconstitutional under INS v. Chadha. See 462 U.S. 919, 923, 959
(1983).
236. See Seat Belt Interlock Option, 39 Fed. Reg. 38,380, 38,380 (Oct. 31, 1974) (to be
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571.208).
237. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985).
238. See id. at 833-35.
239. Id. at 833 (alterations in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1982)).
240. The problem for Congress is not lack of power. Rather, it is lack of political support
or political will. I address this issue infra in Parts III.A & III.B.
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information-gathering tools to better understand the problem the
Executive seeks to address, the nature of the remedies the Execu-
tive chooses, and the likely outcome of the Executive’s actions.
Indeed, a change in policy can provide Congress with particularly
robust information about the impact of two different responses to a
problem.241
Moreover, when Congress considers the details of legislative re-
forms, it participates in a deliberative feedback loop with “We the
People.” Interest groups, the news media, and ordinary citizens a-
round the kitchen table engage in a dialogue and debate concerning
the policy alternatives before Congress.242 This public discourse in
turn shapes congressional outcomes.243
Thus, legislative amendments represent the gold standard of
deliberation-forcing tools available to Congress. They are the ideal
means of resolving interbranch disputes.
2. The Power of the Purse
One of Congress’s most powerful tools for controlling the Execu-
tive is its power over appropriations. The Constitution provides that
“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law.”244 Therefore, if Congress does not
like executive actions that require congressional funds, Congress
can reduce, eliminate, or attach strings to those funds.245 Congress
has made frequent use of its power of the purse to shape executive
action through appropriation riders.246 Appropriation riders place
limits on how an agency can use appropriated funds, notwithstand-
ing what it might otherwise be able to do under existing law.247
For example, despite President Obama’s commitment to closing
the Guantánamo Bay Detention Camp (GITMO), Congress stymied
241. Cf. BESSETTE, supra note 12, at 233 (“[S]eparation of powers conflicts may actually
promote the formation of deliberative majorities.”).
242. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 77-78 (2010).
243. Id. at 17.
244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
245. See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders,
1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 462-63.
246. See id.
247. See id.
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his efforts through its appropriations power.248 Soon after Obama
took office, the Democrat-controlled Congress rejected his request
for eighty million dollars to close the detention center, with the Sen-
ate voting ninety to six to block the use of any funds to transfer or
release prisoners held at GITMO.249 This was sufficient to give the
Administration pause. The following year Congress went further in
its defense appropriations bill, banning the use of funds (1) to
transfer detainees to the United States, even for purposes of pros-
ecution; (2) to purchase or construct any facilities within the United
States for housing any of the detainees; and (3) to transfer any
detainee to a foreign country unless the Secretary of Defense finds
that it is safe to do so.250 Congress included similar restrictions in
subsequent defense appropriations.251 These actions successfully
prevented the Obama Administration from closing GITMO.252
It is often easier for Congress to use appropriations to check the
Executive than to amend or pass new substantive laws. First, be-
cause of the different status quo ante when the Executive needs
appropriated funds for a particular activity, congressional inaction
works against rather than for the Executive.253 Second, as the
GITMO case illustrates, individual appropriations are usually part
of large appropriations bills that the President is reluctant to veto
due to the other essential appropriations in the package. President
Obama signed the Defense Authorization Acts containing the re-
strictions on funds for closing GITMO because the Act provided
funds for other military activities that the President considered
vital.254 Indeed, unlike legislative acts overruling specific executive




250. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-
383, §§ 1032-1034, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351-53 (2011).
251. JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42143,
WARTIME DETENTION PROVISIONS IN RECENT DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION 28 (2016);
MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40754, GUANTANAMO DETENTION CENTER:
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 3-7, 9 (2011).
252. Connie Bruck, Why Obama Has Failed to Close Guantánamo, NEW YORKER (Aug. 1,
2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/08/01/why-obama-has-failed-to-close-guan
tanamo [https://perma.cc/FC4K-RP2H].
253. See Devins, supra note 245, at 473-74, 473 n.113.
254. President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on H.R. 1540 (Dec. 31, 2011),
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actions, which are relatively rare, Congress frequently makes use
of appropriation riders.255
Still, not all executive actions require congressional appropria-
tions. Some executive programs have their own sources of funds. For
example, Congress found it difficult to check the Obama Administra-
tion’s deferred action immigration programs using its power over
appropriations, because the United States Citizenship and Immi-
gration Services, the federal agency responsible for reviewing
applications for deferred action, is entirely self-funded through the
fees it collects on immigration applications.256 This flips the status
quo ante and requires congressional action rather than inaction to
check. Moreover, appropriations will generally be a more effective
tool to check executive action, which generally requires money, than
executive inaction, which generally does not.
Several scholars have criticized Congress’s use of appropriations
to achieve substantive ends as a means of avoiding significant de-
liberation on the merits of the underlying policy.257 Appropriation
riders often bypass the committees with relevant expertise—dimin-
ishing Congress’s understanding of the matter—and are frequently
enacted hastily—minimizing the opportunities for reasoned deliber-
ation.258
Still, appropriation riders can produce some deliberation on the
merits of the policy in dispute. When Congress rebuffed the Obama
Administration’s request for funds to close GITMO and prohibited
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/31/statement-president-hr-1540 [https://
perma.cc/MHW8-26V6] (“The fact that I support this bill as a whole does not mean I agree
with everything in it. In particular, I have signed this bill despite having serious reservations
with certain provisions that regulate the detention, interrogation, and prosecution of sus-
pected terrorists.”).
255. Beermann, supra note 106, at 85-88 (describing several cases).
256. Jennifer Bendery, House Appropriations Committee Confirms Congress Can’t Defund
Obama’s Immigration Action, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/20/defund-obama-immigration-action_n_6191958.html [https://
perma.cc/64HD-QZNT]; Pema Levy, What Can the GOP Do to Stop Obama’s Immigration
Order?, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 20, 2014, 4:55 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/what-can-gop-do-
stop-obamas-immigration-orders-285931 [https://perma.cc/9CAQ-NXXU].
257. See, e.g., Neal E. Devins, Appropriations Redux: A Critical Look at the Fiscal Year
1988 Continuing Resolution, 1988 DUKE L.J. 389, 389-90 (criticizing secretive nondeliberative
process for passing continuing resolutions); Devins, supra note 245, at 456, 458; Edward H.
Stiglitz, Unitary Innovations and Political Accountability, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1153
(2014).
258. See Devins, supra note 245, at 465.
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the use of any appropriations to transfer detainees to the United
States, it was quite clear that Congress was unconvinced of the mer-
its of the President’s plan.259 Some members of Congress expressed
concern with the risks that the detainees might pose if transferred
to the United States and the need for some type of risk assess-
ment.260 Others opposed spending more money on facilities for the
Guantánamo detainees “after spending nearby half a billion dollars
on the Guantánamo facility.”261 Even the President’s Democratic
supporters felt that the Administration had simply not provided a
credible plan for closing the base and handling the transfers.262 
Moreover, appropriations are generally limited in their time
horizon, usually to a fiscal year.263 Thus, Congress must periodically
revisit the substantive issue planted in an appropriations act,
unlike permanent statutes without an expiration date.264 This shift
in the status quo opens up opportunities for deliberative interven-
tions in response to changes in the composition of Congress or in
public opinion.265 Imagine, for example, if the prohibition on federal
recognition of same-sex marriages at the state level in the Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA) had been enacted through an appropri-
ations rider rather than a substantive law. Because of the shift in
public opinion, it is hard to imagine Congress continuing to pass an
appropriations rider with such a prohibition by 2009, if not earlier.
The Democrats controlled both houses of the 111th Congress and
259. Senate Blocks Transfer of Gitmo Detainees, NBCNEWS.COM (May 20, 2009, 8:52 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/30826649/ns/politics-capitol_hill/t/senate-blocks-transfer-gitmo-
detainees/ [https://perma.cc/HA68-MY4Y].
260. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-230, at 464 (2009), as reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1382,
1476; see also 155 CONG. REC. 32,467 (2009) (statement of Rep. Tiahrt) (“Terrorists do not
belong in the streets or prisons of America.”).
261. 155 CONG. REC. 32,465 (statement of Rep. Mica).
262. Senator Daniel Inouye, D-Hawaii, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, who
favored closing Guantánamo, sought to eliminate the funds because “the administration ha[d]
not offered a workable plan at this point.” See Senate Blocks Transfer of Gitmo Detainees,
supra note 259.
263. See STEVEN S. SMITH ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 384 (9th ed. 2015); Archie
Parnell, Congressional Interference in Agency Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J.
1360, 1376 (1980).
264. But see Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 249-50 (2007)
(arguing that temporary legislation is much more common than most scholars assume).
265. See id. at 252 (discussing the impact of shifts in the legislative status quo on
temporary legislation).
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President Obama had campaigned on repealing DOMA.266 Certainly,
the issue would have been raised during debates over the appropria-
tions. Even before the 111th Congress, given the significant shift in
public opinion regarding same-sex marriage since 1996,267 oppo-
nents of DOMA might have attempted to mount a filibuster in the
Senate or raised the issue in the Democrat-controlled House. But
DOMA survived until the Supreme Court struck it down in 2013,
because Congress’s minority-empowering rules make it difficult to
repeal laws that have lost political support.268 Similarly, in the case
of Guantánamo, the Obama Administration could have returned to
Congress if it believed it was in a stronger position politically or
might have reached a compromise regarding the detention facility.
Military appropriations are bills that Congress will ultimately en-
act, so if the Administration had put forward a politically credible
plan, it would have likely produced deliberation as part of the
appropriations process.
Thus, although congressional checks on the Executive through
appropriations do not tend to produce the same level of delibera-
tion as substantive legislation, they do produce some deliberation
on the merits of the underlying policy dispute, create opportunities
for deliberation in subsequent Congresses, and avoid strong en-
trenchment of the enacting (appropriating) coalition’s views.
3. Collateral Political Attacks
Beyond direct checks on executive action through legislative
amendments and appropriations, Congress can also mount collat-
eral political attacks on the Executive. As Justice Scalia described
it, “Nothing says ‘enforce the Act’ quite like ‘... or you will have mon-
ey for little else.’”269 That is, Congress can withhold its support for
collateral presidential priorities or personnel even when Congress
cannot overrule the Executive directly. The President cannot go for
266. Andy Towle, Barack Obama Writes Open Letter to LGBT Community, TOWLEROAD
(Feb. 28, 2008, 2:30 PM), http://www.towleroad.com/2008/02/barack-obama-wr/ [https://perma.
cc/9947-BZ66].
267. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 12, at 362-63.
268. See id. at 377-78.
269. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2705 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (omis-
sion in original).
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long without legislative achievements, money for important pro-
grams, or confirmation of judges and executive branch officials.
Thus, to the extent that certain executive actions are shielded from
direct attacks, the House or Senate can always threaten some other
policy or personnel. Indeed, this vulnerability to Congress leads
some to believe that courts should eschew interbranch disputes and
leave them entirely to political struggle and compromise.270
Collateral political attacks are easier to mount than legislative
action or appropriations because they do not necessarily require ag-
reement among a controlling congressional coalition. Individual
Senators and key members of Congress can be a thorn in the side of
the President by withholding their approval from pieces of his leg-
islative agenda or his nominees to the bureaucracy and the federal
bench.271 Such congressional inaction and obstruction does not
require the broad consensus (and in some cases supermajorities) of
legislative action.272 Thus, as with appropriations, the status quo
favors collateral political attacks inasmuch as the President needs
action from Congress. But unlike large appropriations bills, which
are difficult to hold hostage forever, a hold on a nominee for a
federal judgeship or an executive position below the cabinet level
can persist for quite some time without any impact on the rest of
Congress’s work.273
Although collateral political attacks are an easy way to bring the
Executive to heel, they are not well suited to producing deliberation
on the merits of the policy over which the two branches disagree.
270. Id. at 2704 (“Our system is designed for confrontation. That is what ‘[a]mbition ...
counteract[ing] ambition,’ is all about.” (alterations in the original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST
NO. 51, supra note 166, at 264 (James Madison))); Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 55 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) (“[E]xcept where a conventional lawsuit requires a judicial resolu-
tion, much of the allocation of powers is best left to political struggle and compromise.”),
vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
271. See Beermann, supra note 106, at 136-37.
272. These types of attacks raise distinct normative concerns because they are often not
transparent, do not enjoy majority support in the chamber, and can harm unrelated policies
and personnel. Id. at 140-41. Thus, they are unlikely to produce the desired political delib-
eration.
273. Of course, the ability of Congress or members of Congress to punish the President
through collateral attacks will (as with everything else) depend on the politics of the case.
That is, it will depend on how congressional constituents view the disputed law and how they
feel about the presidential priorities or personnel vulnerable to congressional attack. Id. at
111.
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The debate is likely to shift from the underlying policy dispute to
the collateral political attack itself.274 Moreover, collateral political
attacks by definition impact presidential policies and personnel
unrelated to the underlying policy dispute.275 Thus, they are costly
for our political system and do a poor job of containing interbranch
disputes to areas of true disagreement.
4. Impeachment and Censure
The strongest medicine available to Congress in conflicts with the
Executive is impeachment. The Constitution provides that “[t]he
President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States
[may] be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”276
There is some debate over whether “high Crimes and Misdemean-
ors” should involve only official misconduct,277 but because the
Supreme Court has demurred from setting any standards in the
impeachment process,278 it is a political question for the House and
Senate to judge. The House has voted to impeach a President only
twice in our nation’s history, and neither President was convicted
274. See id. at 110-11 (examining the Senate’s use of the appointments power as leverage
for unrelated political gains).
275. See id. at 127 (questioning the motives of some members of Congress in acquiring
information from the Executive).
276. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. In order to remove an official in this way, the House of Rep-
resentatives must vote to approve articles of impeachment and the Senate must then vote by
a two-thirds majority to convict the official on the impeachment charges. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5
(“The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.”); id. art. I, § 3,
cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.... [N]o Person shall be
convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.”).
277. Scholars generally agree that impeachment should be reserved for particularly
egregious acts that threaten our system of government rather than a way to resolve run-of-
the-mill policy disagreements. See, e.g., Neil Kinkopf, The Scope of “High Crimes and
Misdemeanors” After the Impeachment of President Clinton, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 201,
202 (2000) (“There is broad agreement among scholars, members of Congress, and other
commentators that a necessary element of any high crime and misdemeanor is great injury
directly to the constitutional system of government.”).
278. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 234 (1993) (“[T]he Judiciary, and the
Supreme Court in particular, were not chosen to have any role in impeachments.”).
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after a trial in the Senate.279 Thus, Congress itself appears to view
impeachment as something to use rarely.
Congress or an individual house of Congress can also censure the
President for executive action. The House of Representatives and
the Senate have each censured a President for conduct that did not
rise to the level of impeachment.280 Unlike a successful impeach-
ment, however, censure has no legal effect; the President remains
in office and need not change his behavior.
Impeachment proceedings or a censure motion are likely to
produce political deliberation on the President’s actions.281 But if
history is any guide, then these mechanisms might not produce
deliberation on the merits of the underlying policy dispute between
the political branches. The impeachment of President Clinton
focused on his conduct during civil litigation unrelated to any gov-
ernment policy.282 The impeachment of President Andrew Johnson
focused on whether his removal of Secretary Edwin Stanton from
office violated the Tenure of Office Act, rather than Congress’s
279. President Andrew Johnson was impeached in 1868, Marjorie Cohn, Open-and-Shut:
Senate Impeachment Deliberations Must Be Public, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 365, 368, 380-85 (2000),
and President William Jefferson Clinton was impeached in 1998, Fred H. Altshuler,
Comparing the Nixon and Clinton Impeachments, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 745, 745, 752 (2000). The
House Judiciary Committee reported a bill of impeachment against President Richard Nixon
to the full House, but Nixon resigned before the House could vote on his impeachment. Id. at
745 n.1.
280. In 1834, the Senate censured President Andrew Jackson for withholding documents
concerning his defunding of the Bank of the United States. Michael J. Gerhardt, Essay, The
Constitutionality of Censure, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 33, 35-36 (1999). In 1848, the House of
Representatives censured President James Polk for beginning the Mexican-American War
“unnecessar[ily] and unconstitutional[ly].” James C. Ho, Misunderstood Precedent: Andrew
Jackson and the Real Case Against Censure, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 300 n.71 (2000)
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 95, 304 (1848)). Motions for censure have been
introduced but have not passed on a few other occasions. See Gerhardt, supra, at 35. It is
interesting that this has occurred so infrequently. Perhaps it is because the censure has no
tangible impact. Although one would think that it would be politically costly for the President,
it might be even more costly for Congress as a demonstration of its impotence. Alternatively,
because Congress has a variety of other ways of imposing tangible costs on the President, it
might prefer collateral attacks on substantive policies or personnel to the public theater of
censure. See id. at 33-34.
281. But such decision must be public to produce the desired deliberation. Cohn, supra note
279, at 366 (“Although the American public had direct television access to nearly every stage
of the impeachment [of President Clinton], the actual decision-making in this historic case
took place behind closed doors.”).
282. See Altshuler, supra note 279, at 751-52.
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disagreement with President Johnson’s approach to Reconstruc-
tion.283
Moreover, given the high political costs, Congress should reserve
impeachment for truly egregious conduct. Impeachment should not
be the congressional response to a sincere presidential belief about
how best to interpret a vague statute, or a sincere presidential belief
that a congressional statute unconstitutionally infringes on individ-
ual rights or the President’s own executive power.284 In such cases,
the game is not worth the candle.
5. Judicial Review and Standing in Private Parties
Another means by which Congress circumscribes executive action
while conserving resources is by giving private parties the power to
sue the Executive when it strays too far from Congress’s statutory
mandates. Congress can, within constitutional limits, construct
standing on behalf of the constituents it seeks to benefit with its
legislative acts.285 Although Congress may not hand the courthouse
keys to any citizen, “Congress has the power to define injuries and
articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or con-
troversy where none existed before.”286 Thus, the beneficiaries of
laws aimed at protecting the environment,287 improving the quality
of the air,288 or ensuring public access to important information289
generally have standing to challenge the Executive’s implementa-
tion of those laws if they can establish that the government action
or inaction has injured them in a concrete and personal way.290
Private standing is less effective, however, at circumscribing the
Executive’s implementation of a law when it involves certain types
283. See Cohn, supra note 279, at 383.
284. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1309 (1996) (“[The Framers’] concern that the President
not be reduced to serving at the pleasure of the Congress indicates that mere congressional
disagreements with the President’s policies do not rise to the level of ‘high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.’”).
285. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., id. at 557-58 (majority opinion).
288. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839-40
(1984).
289. See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 13-14 (1998).
290. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 566-67.
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of nonenforcement. First, it is not always clear who is harmed by
nonenforcement of certain laws. In the case of DOMA, for example,
it was not evident who benefited in a concrete and personal way
from the denial of federal recognition of same-sex marriages rec-
ognized at the state level.291 The beneficiaries of DOMA are difficult
to identify. As a result, if President Obama had declined to enforce
DOMA, it is questionable whether anyone would have had standing
to challenge the President’s nonenforcement.
Second, even when laws have clear beneficiaries, the injured
party must be able to establish that it is injured by nonenforcement
in a concrete, personal, and actual or imminent way.292 The
plaintiffs in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife were unable to establish
standing to protest the failure of the Department of Interior to
enforce certain provisions of the Endangered Species Act because,
although nonenforcement might injure those who wanted to observe
certain endangered species that the Act sought to protect, the
plaintiffs had no concrete plans to visit the animals’ natural hab-
itats.293 As a result, the Court held that the alleged injury lacked
imminence.294
Third, the Executive’s exercise of enforcement discretion is pre-
sumptively unreviewable.295 Consequently, a court will not review
nonenforcement decisions unless they are based on constitutional
objections, a belief that the Executive does not have jurisdiction, or
an abdication of the Executive’s responsibilities under the statute.296
Congress can, however, flip this presumption by providing guide-
lines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers.297
291. Similarly, it was not clear who benefited from a statutory ban on HIV-positive mem-
bers serving in the military, which President Clinton signed as part of an appropriations bill
in 1996, but refused to defend before it was ultimately repealed. See National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 567, 110 Stat. 186, 328-29,
repealed by Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 2707, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-30; Press
Briefing, Jack Quinn, Counsel to the President, & Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 9, 1996), http://clinton6.nara.gov/1996/02/
1996-02-09-quinn-and-dellinger-briefing-on-hiv-provision.html [https://perma.cc/C3EB-YNN5].
292. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
293. See id. at 562-63 (“Of course, the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for
purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing.”).
294. See id. at 563-64.
295. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
296. See id. at 833 n.4, 838. 
297. See id. at 833.
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Constructing private standing in congressional enactments
encourages deliberation concerning the law’s intended beneficiaries
and who should have a ticket to the courthouse.298 The articulation
of statutory benefits and burdens makes the impact of proposed
polices more transparent and is precisely the type of legislative
deliberation that should be encouraged.299 This practice helps
political representatives and the public understand the full costs
and benefits of legislative acts. In addition, deliberation over private
standing allows the enacting Congress to fine-tune the benefits that
it seeks to deliver.300 In some cases, Congress may want to limit the
scope of judicial review,301 whereas in other cases, Congress will
want to push the limits of standing available under Article III to
constrain future executives.302 In either case, the enacting Congress
will confront these questions when it crafts its substantive mandate,
rather than deferring decisions about the strength of the law to the
political branches down the road. Thus, providing private parties
with standing to seek judicial review may have deliberative benefits
akin to that of other forms of legislative action with policy goals.303
298. See, e.g., Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99
YALE L.J. 341, 353-54 (1989) (describing congressional deliberation over creating qui tam and
citizen suits).
299. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 81 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3748 (describing a citizen suit provision in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1971 as consistent with the Act’s goal of developing “clear and identifiable
requirements ... for enforcement”).
300. See, e.g., Air Pollution—1970: Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3446, and S. 3546 Before the
Subcomm. on Air & Water Pollution of the Comm. on Pub. Works, 91st Cong. 621-23 (1970)
(statement of James Moorman) (arguing that a private attorneys general provision will
“materially speed up the process of restoring our nation’s air quality” under the Clean Air Act
because “we cannot rely solely on government officials alone to get the job done” and
suggesting that including an action for damages would stimulate greater enforcement).
301. For example, the 1998 Veterans’ Judicial Review Act bars courts from reviewing
certain decisions by the Secretary of Veteran Affairs, see 38 U.S.C. §§ 511(a), 512 (2012);
Bates v. Nicholson, 398 F.3d 1355, 1362-65 (Fed. Cir. 2005), and the 1996 Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act substantially limits review of immigration and
deportation orders, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2012).
302. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[T]he citizen
suits provision reflected a deliberate choice by Congress to widen citizen access to the courts,
as a supplemental and effective assurance that the Act would be implemented and enforced.”
(quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1975))).
303. See Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV.
159, 174-76 (2011).
1308 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1253
Nevertheless, such deliberation is most likely to occur before a
live interbranch dispute with the Executive. If Congress does not
provide private parties with standing to seek judicial review ex ante,
it is unlikely to do so, at least without more, ex post. Providing for
private standing and judicial review requires legislative action. If
Congress has the political support to check the Executive legisla-
tively, it is hard to see why it would merely delegate the job to
private parties. Congress is more likely to constrain the Executive
in one of the other ways outlined above. Therefore, attention to
private standing ex ante should produce important deliberative ben-
efits, but Congress is unlikely to use standing alone to check the
Executive in the midst of a live interbranch policy dispute.
6. Creating an Independent Agency
If Congress is concerned with the President’s manipulation of
statutory discretion to serve the President’s agenda, or Congress
simply wants more influence over the execution of the law, then
Congress can delegate executive authority to an independent agen-
cy rather than an agency headed by an appointee who serves at the
pleasure of the President.304 It is conventional wisdom that agency
304. For adherents of a unitary executive, limiting the President’s control over executive
officials is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Andrew Coan & Nicholas Bullard, Judicial Capacity
and Executive Power, 102 VA. L. REV. 765, 787-88, 788 n.113 (2016) (citing multiple scholarly
sources arguing for the unitary executive theory). But the Supreme Court has approved
congressional limits on the power to remove executive officials. In Morrison v. Olson, for
example, the Court approved for cause removal restrictions on independent counsel charged
with prosecuting crimes of executive branch officials. See 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988). The
Attorney General, rather than the President, removed the independent counsel for cause, but
the Court treated the Attorney General as the President’s proxy. Id. at 692-93. Prosecutors
are generally considered to be the quintessential executive officials. See id. at 705-06 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (stating the appointment of an independent counsel “deprives the President of
exclusive control over [a] quintessentially executive activity”); Matthew A. Samberg, Note,
“Established by Law”: Saving Statutory Limitations on Presidential Appointments from
Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1735, 1745 (2010) (describing prosecutors as quint-
essentially executive); Hanah Metchis Volokh, Note, Congressional Immunity Grants and
Separation of Powers: Legislative Vetoes of Federal Prosecutions, 95 GEO. L.J. 2017, 2029
(2007) (same). But see Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function?
Morrison v. Olson and the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1070 (1990) (arguing that “the
Framers did not intend prosecution to be a core executive function”). For cause removal
protection is generally interpreted to mean that the President may not remove the protected
official based merely on policy disagreements. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Political Will and the
Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
2017] LEGISLATIVE EXHAUSTION 1309
heads shielded from the President with “for cause” employment
protections, term limits, and the like will be more responsive to
congressional preferences.305 
To the extent that Congress attempts to shield an agency ex
post—for example, in response to an objectionable executive ac-
tion—Congress will face the same barriers as with substantive
legislative action. But if Congress can muster the political will to
overcome presidential resistance, it is hard to see how it is worth
the effort merely to provide a presidential appointee with more in-
dependence. The agency may not change course and congressional
efforts may be for naught. As a result, Congress is more likely to use
this tool, like private standing, ex ante when creating the agency or
delegating it authority.
The merits of any interbranch policy dispute will likely be tan-
gential to deliberation over whether the President can be trusted
with executive authority. Debates over agency independence are
likely to focus on the appropriateness of political influence over the
field of action rather than the underlying merits of specific policies
that Congress would like to see protected from presidential inter-
ference.306 Members of Congress may vote for agency independence
273, 278 (1993) (stating that for cause removal protection “encourages agency heads to ...
engage in policy disputes with the White House”).
Thus, if Congress may insulate prosecutors from the President, it can probably insulate a
plethora of other executive officials, so long as the protections do not interfere with the
President’s constitutional functions, Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690-93, and Congress does not
create more than one layer of for cause protection between the President and the executive
official, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010) (“We
hold that the dual for-cause limitations on the removal of Board members contravene the
Constitution’s separation of powers.”). Exploring the limits of removal protection is beyond
the scope of this Article, but undoubtedly some high executive branch officials must serve at
the pleasure of the President.
305. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 25 (2010) (“Scholars concerned with maintaining the power of the
unitary executive have made much of the fact that independent agencies shift power from the
President to Congress.”).
306. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 531-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing the
remarks of Senator Morgan upon creation of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that a pol-
itical party should not “hold the power of life and death over the great business interests of
this country” (quoting 51 CONG. REC. 8857 (1914))); see also Marshall J. Breger & Gary J.
Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies,
52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1132 (2000) (“It was also believed that the FTC needed to be inde-
pendent in order to correct ‘the partisan and pressure-controlled administration of the anti-
trust laws by the Department of Justice.’” (quoting ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT
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on the grounds that it needs to shield the subject matter from
ordinary politics rather than on the basis of the underlying policy
dispute.307
Moreover, unlike the provisions of private standing and judicial
review, delegating responsibility for the defense and enforcement of
federal law to an independent agency will not encourage the enact-
ing Congress to deliberate about the beneficiaries of the law and the
costs and benefits of judicial review. Indeed, it might produce less
attention if the enacting Congress believes the independent agency
will not shrink from executing the law to the fullest extent possible. 
In sum, insulating an agency from the President would likely
produce little deliberation on the merits of a live interbranch policy
dispute and less deliberation than attention to private standing on
the scope of substantive statutory provisions.
7. Legislative Standing
The most compelling argument in favor of legislative standing is
that Congress provides a ready, willing, and able party to challenge
the Executive over its implementation of the law.308 But Congress
will not challenge the Executive at all times. During times of unified
government, Congress is unlikely to mount such suits.309 Even in
times of divided government, Congress will not challenge all ex-
ecutive actions it dislikes. Intervention will depend, just like the
President’s decision not to enforce or defend a law, on the extent of
political support for the law.310 Nevertheless, during times of divided
government, lawsuits may be an alluring alternative to legislative
efforts in the face of a presidential veto threat.
Congress’s presence in court does not itself further legislative
deliberation. Litigation is a distinct enterprise from deliberation on
the floors of Congress. Whereas legislative deliberation is multi-
vocal and speaks to diverse audiences, a party in court speaks to a
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 189 (1972))).
307. Barkow, supra note 305, at 19-21.
308. Of course this presumes that we need more parties to challenge the Executive during
times of divided government, which not everyone accepts.
309. See supra note 4 (describing the House’s motion to delay its suit against the Obama
Administration due to the advent of unified government).
310. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Lecture, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J.
1183, 1211-12 (2012).
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single decision maker in the language of the law.311 Moreover,
Congress does not vote on legal briefs, which would be impractical.
Thus, in the context of litigation, Congress must delegate its author-
ity to lawyers and perhaps a committee overseeing the lawyers, such
as the House Bi-Partisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG).312 Although
deliberation among the legislators on such a committee may occur,
the committee will represent only a sliver of the whole House.313
Legislative standing is in significant tension with the deliberative
goals of our Madisonian system. Although litigation can spur public
discussion of policy or constitutional values, such discourse is in-
complete without Congress playing its deliberative role “to refine
and enlarge the public views.”314 Legislative standing, like an in-
dependent legal defense counsel, would enable Congress to avoid
politically uncomfortable debates on the merits of controversial
policies by paying homage to “the judicial department[‘s power] to
say what the law is”315 and delegating its constitutional views to the
lawyers.316 Litigation is not deliberation; indeed, in some respects it
is the polar opposite of what the Founders envisioned for our
political institutions.317 The courtroom provides no opportunity for
311. See Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 947 (2012) (noting that
when parties bring disputes to court they present their competing views to an “impartial
decisionmaker”).
312. There is no institutional mechanism for Congress as a body to participate in litigation.
Rather, each house has its own counsel’s office and its own procedures for participating in
litigation. See generally id. at 942-47. The Office of the Senate Legal Counsel may, pursuant
to a joint resolution adopted by the Senate, intervene in any pending legal action “in which
the powers and responsibilities of Congress under the Constitution of the United States are
placed in issue.” 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b(c), 288e(a) (2012). In the House, the general counsel to the
clerk of the House of Representatives, who serves at the pleasure of the Speaker, may
participate in litigation on behalf of the House pursuant to a majority vote of the BLAG,
which consists of the Speaker, the majority leader, the majority whip, the minority leader, and
the minority whip. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 114th CONG., R. II(8) (2015).
But “[o]n occasion, however, the general counsel acts under the authority of just the majority
leadership or even the Speaker alone.” Frost, supra note 311, at 944; see also infra notes 321-
24 and accompanying text (describing BLAG’s intervention in the DOMA litigation). 
313. Cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the
Unbundled Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696, 1700 (2009) (noting how Presidents must
compete with committee chairs, who represent a single state or congressional district, for
control of the bureaucracy).
314. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 166, at 51 (James Madison).
315. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
316. See, e.g., infra notes 321-24 and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 166, at 51 (James Madison).
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the type of free and open exchange that can change minds and forge
compromises in a democratic society.318
Thus, any deliberative benefits of legislative standing must stem
from congressional deliberation over whether to bring suit. But
these decisions are procedural questions and do not force Congress
to come to grips with the policy implications of the law or the rea-
sons for its enactment.319 Whereas legislative repeal efforts force
Congress to deliberate the merits of the policy under review, votes
on whether to defend a law can be grounded in reasons divorced
from the merits of the underlying policy. For example, members of
Congress can simply cite their desire for judicial resolution of the
statutory or constitutional question to check a unilateral executive
veto. Indeed, the stakes are quite low because the judiciary will
make the final decision even if Congress votes to intervene. So,
votes on legislative intervention in lawsuits do not have much
potential for transformative deliberation.
The House decision to defend DOMA illustrates the dearth of
political deliberation that legislative standing produces. BLAG de-
cided to intervene without any deliberation on the floor of the
House.320 It was not until BLAG’s authority to intervene on behalf
of the House was questioned that the full House voted to authorize
BLAG’s continued defense of DOMA as part of a vote on the House
rules.321 But even then, virtually no debate on the question oc-
curred.322 The House leadership explained BLAG’s defense of DOMA
based not on the law’s normative merits, but on the view that the
judiciary should have the final say on the law’s constitutionality.323
318. See PETTIT, supra note 192, at 187-91; RICHARDSON, supra note 192, at 184-90.
319. See Frost, supra note 311, at 949 (noting that Congress purposely leaves statutes
vague so courts or agencies can interpret them).
320. BLAG met for thirty minutes behind closed doors and then voted along party lines to
intervene. Molly K. Hooper, House Leaders Vote to Intervene in DOMA Defense, HILL (Mar.
9, 2011, 10:43 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/148521-house-leaders-
vote-to-intervene-in-doma-defense [https://perma.cc/9QX4-TCXG].
321. See 159 CONG. REC. H8 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2013).
322. Representative Eric Cantor inserted a section-by-section analysis of the House
Resolution into the record, justifying BLAG’s intervention due to “the Executive Branch’s
abdication of its constitutional responsibility” to defend a congressional act, while Repre-
sentatives Jerrold Nadler and Adam Schiff spoke briefly in opposition of authorizing BLAG
to intervene based on the costs of litigation and their opinion that DOMA was unconsti-
tutional. Id. at H13, H17.
323. See id. at H13; see also Press Release, House Speaker John Boehner, Statement by
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This is hardly the type of substantive political deliberation that
interbranch disagreements about the meaning of the Constitution
should produce.
Similarly, the House decision to sue the Executive over its failure
to meet certain statutory deadlines for implementing the Affordable
Care Act (ACA)324 had nothing to do with the merits of a policy
dispute between the House and the Executive over health care.
Indeed, when the House authorized the lawsuit, it had already
voted fifty times to repeal the ACA in whole or in part.325 Rather,
during the House deliberations on the lawsuit, Republicans pointed
to President Obama’s unconstitutional usurpation of legislative
power and declared it was Congress’s, not the Executive’s, job to
amend the law.326 Indeed, the lawsuit was so untethered from spe-
cific policy issues that the House Resolution authorized the Speaker
of the House to “initiate or intervene in one or more civil actions ...
with respect to implementation of any provision of the [ACA].”327 The
House essentially authorized a roving commission to bring any legal
claims that might stick.
* * * 
In sum, Congress has a variety of tools to bring the Executive to
heel in interbranch conflicts, but not all of them will produce
legislative deliberation on the merits of the underlying dispute.
Legislative amendments are likely to produce the richest delibera-
tion; appropriation acts are likely to produce some, but less robust,
House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) Regarding the Defense of Marriage Act (Mar. 4, 2011),
http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/statement-house-speaker-john-boehner-r-oh-regarding-
defense-marriage-act [https://perma.cc/6BE4-JE3K] (“The constitutionality of this law should
be determined by the courts—not by the president unilaterally—and this action by the House
will ensure the matter is addressed in a manner consistent with our Constitution.”).
324. See Complaint, supra note 4, at 15.
325. See 160 CONG. REC. H7091 (daily ed. July 30, 2014) (statement of Rep. Hoyer on H.R.
Res. 676).
326. See generally 160 CONG. REC. H7087-100 (daily ed. July 30, 2014) (debate on H.R.
676). The House had not yet developed the claim discussed below in Part III.C concerning the
Executive’s use of unappropriated funds.
327. H.R. Res. 676, 113th Cong. (2014), 160 CONG. REC. H7087 (daily ed. July 30, 2014)
(emphasis added); see also Deirdre Walsh, GOP-Led House Authorizes Lawsuit Against
Obama, CNN (July 31, 2014, 8:04 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/30/politics/gop-obama-
lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/DQ74-PBL3].
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deliberation; and collateral political attacks and agency insulating
devices are likely to produce the least deliberation on the merits of
policy disputes. In addition, attention to private standing will
produce important deliberation by enacting coalitions about the
costs and benefits of federal laws, whereas congressional standing
is unlikely to produce legislative deliberation on the merits of policy
disputes.
Therefore, legislative amendment, appropriation acts, and at-
tention to private standing fare well when measured against the
deliberative goal of interbranch conflict, whereas collateral political
attacks, agency insulating devices, and congressional standing fare
poorly. To the extent standing doctrine seeks to further interbranch
deliberation, it should encourage congressional use of deliberation-
promoting tools and discourage the use of tools that undermine or
substitute for deliberative actions in nondeliberative ways.
With this framework in mind, the next Part returns to the
Legislative Exhaustion principle raised at the end of Part I.
III. A DELIBERATION-ENHANCING APPROACH TO LEGISLATIVE
STANDING
Any theory of legislative standing to challenge executive action
should be cognizant of the deliberation the Framers hoped such
interbranch conflicts would produce. This Part develops the Legis-
lative Exhaustion principle with these deliberation-forcing goals
front and center. It further defines how Legislative Exhaustion
would operate in practice, examines the principle’s strengths and
weaknesses, and applies Legislative Exhaustion to House v. Burwell
and other cases of interbranch litigation.
A. The Legislative Exhaustion Principle
Consistent with the deliberative goals of interbranch conflict,
Legislative Exhaustion would preclude congressional lawsuits
when Congress can remedy its harm with tools that are likely to
produce deliberation on the merits of its dispute with the Executive.
Thus, when the Executive claims to act pursuant to statutory
authority, whether based on an interpretation of the law or the
exercise of enforcement discretion, Legislative Exhaustion would
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bar Congress from suing the Executive in federal court. In such
cases, Congress has the means of directly checking the Executive
through legislative action, and permitting legislative lawsuits risks
undermining the deliberative function of interbranch conflict.
Therefore, Legislative Exhaustion requires the court to look not
just at Congress’s claim, but also at the Executive’s defense.
Congress must be able to show that the Executive is acting based
on constitutional, rather than any claimed statutory, authority.
To be sure, this assumes good faith on the part of the Executive
when it offers a rationale for its execution of the law—in other
words, whether it is acting pursuant to statutory or constitutional
authority. But fortunately, the Executive is usually clear about the
legal bases for its actions. For example, the Executive provided
extensive analysis of the statutory support for the Department of
Homeland Security’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals and
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans programs328 and of the
constitutional basis for its decision not to defend DOMA.329 The
Legislative Exhaustion principle would encourage the Executive to
be even clearer, particularly when its interpretation of a statute
would shield the Executive from congressional lawsuits.330 Indeed,
if the Executive provided no statutory justification for its actions,
then a court might presume the Executive was acting based on its
328. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t et al. (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2P3D-VZTM] (regarding policies for the removal of undocumented
immigrants); Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
to León Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. (Nov. 20, 2014), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XE9H-7NR4] (exercising prosecutorial discretion with respect to individ-
uals who came to the United States as children); Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y,
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border
Prot., et al. (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets.s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/46ZT-KN8Y].
329. Letter from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Repre-
sentative (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-
litigation-involving-defense-marriage-act [https://perma.cc/KE4Z-L83L] (explaining constitu-
tional reasons for decision not to defend DOMA).
330. To be sure, the Executive might offer both statutory and constitutional reasons for its
action, such as interpreting the statute in a particular way in order to avoid constitutional
doubts. In such cases, Congress still has its own remedy unless and until it amends the
statute so that such an interpretation is no longer possible under the constitutional avoidance
canon and the Executive refuses to enforce the statute as clarified. See supra Part II.B.1.
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constitutional authority—from a functional standpoint there would
be no difference331—and might treat the suit on this basis.
In this way, the courts can serve an information-forcing function,
with Legislative Exhaustion facilitating a dialogue between the
political branches. The articulation of the Executive’s statutory
interpretation enables Congress to overrule interpretations it
considers inconsistent with good policy.332 Such legislative action
encourages enhanced deliberation on the merits of government
policy. Conversely, opening the courthouse door to Congress in such
circumstances might distract and deter it from refining statutory
regimes and government programs in response to changing cir-
cumstances and executive initiatives. Therefore, a Legislative
Exhaustion principle that denies Congress access to the federal
courts when legislative alternatives can provide Congress with the
remedy that it seeks is consistent with the deliberation-forcing
goals of interbranch conflicts.
Congress does not truly exhaust its legislative remedies against
the Executive in any policy dispute unless and until it overrules the
Executive through legislative amendment, and the Executive ref-
uses to execute the law on constitutional grounds in the way that
Congress prescribes. The constitutional basis for the Executive’s
defiance may be express or implied due to the absence of any
statutory rationale.333 Thus, a failed attempt to overrule the Ex-
ecutive—because Congress cannot muster political majorities to
pass a legislative amendment or cannot muster the supermajorities
needed to override the President’s veto—does not exhaust Con-
gress’s legislative remedies. Legislative failure is not final—there is
331. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (“The
President’s power, if any, ... must stem either from an act of Congress or from the
Constitution itself.”); id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President acts in absence
of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers.”).
332. Although the Executive does not always articulate the precise limits of enforcement
discretion under a given statute, Congress still retains the power to revise the statute in such
a way as to prohibit whatever nonenforcement decisions it finds objectionable. See supra Part
II.B.1.
333. As suggested supra in note 332 and accompanying text, in the absence of a statutory
justification for Congress’s actions, such as “a pattern of nonenforcement of clear statutory
language,” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring), a court may
conclude that Congress has exhausted its legislative remedies because functionally the
Executive could be relying only upon its constitutional powers.
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no legislative version of res judicata—and legislative deliberation
regarding contested government policies is a continuous process. In
this way, Legislative Exhaustion differs from the exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies. Agencies might hear a motion for reconsider-
ation, but they will otherwise bar duplicative proceedings once a
party has lost in the administrative forum.334 Parties who obtain a
final administrative order may then, under administrative ex-
haustion principles, turn to the federal courts.335 Legislatures do not
issue final orders, however.
Therefore, a strict Legislative Exhaustion principle would bar
Congress from federal court whenever legislative relief is available.
If at first Congress does not succeed, it must try again. Congress
must rely on the legislative forum whenever it is available. It does
not exhaust its legislative remedies until the President refuses to
adhere to a validly enacted law based on constitutional objections.
Once the Executive refuses to enforce a law based on constitu-
tional objections, however, Congress has exhausted the legislative
remedies likely to produce deliberation on the merits of the policy
dispute. If the Executive does not defend nonenforcement based on
statutory grounds, whether based on its enforcement discretion or
an interpretation of its statutory mandate, new legislation can do
nothing to overrule the Executive.336 Only a judicial decision can
resolve the interbranch dispute over the Executive’s obligations
under the Constitution.337
Although Congress certainly can punish the Executive by attack-
ing collateral policies or personnel, censuring the President, or even
impeaching him, such punishment is unlikely to produce delib-
eration on the merits of the underlying policy dispute.338 Moreover,
these actions may hurt policies and personnel for reasons unrelated
to their merits. If the normative goal of Legislative Exhaustion
is to encourage deliberation on the merits of government policy,
then there is little reason to require Congress to exhaust efforts that
are unlikely to produce the desired deliberation. In such cases,
334. See, e.g., Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (recognizing
that once agency proceedings are finalized, the next step is to challenge in federal court).
335. See id.
336. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 12, at 408.
337. See id.
338. See supra Parts II.B.3-4.
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legislative lawsuits are merely substituting for other nonoptimal—
and perhaps less optimal—congressional checks on the Executive.
The one argument in favor of denying standing to Congress in all
suits against the Executive is that it might encourage Congress to
devote greater attention ex ante to creating standing in private
parties who could themselves challenge executive nonenforcement
based on constitutional objections.339 Focusing on which parties
should have standing to haul the Executive into court and why
would make the costs and benefits of legislation more transparent
and would contribute to more robust legislative deliberation.340 But
attention to private standing ex ante will not promote deliberation
on the merits of an interbranch policy dispute ex post. Thus, the
reasons for precluding Congress from going to court are less com-
pelling if the goal is to enhance legislative deliberation on the
interbranch conflict. Moreover, legislative lawsuits might be a way
for Congress to express its constitutional views.
B. Legislative Exhaustion and Unicameral Suits
Would the Legislative Exhaustion principle work any differently
when only one house of Congress sues the Executive? When
Congress has nonjudicial remedies, as in disputes over statutory
meaning, one house of Congress (or even individual representatives)
would be able to pursue these same remedies.341 But unlike
Congress itself, the House or the Senate alone cannot obtain the
remedy it seeks. Even with sufficient political will, each house can
block the other,342 whereas the Executive does not have the power
to block Congress if it has the votes to override a presidential
veto.343 Should this distinction make a difference?
339. Despite the difficulties of challenging executive nonenforcement discussed supra in
Part I.D, the presumption against reviewability of nonenforcement decisions does not apply
to nonenforcement based on constitutional objections, see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
839 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring), or “a pattern of nonenforcement of clear statutory
language,” id.; accord id. at 833 (majority opinion).
340. Conversely, if Congress had access to the courthouse it might have less reason to
attend to private standing in substantive legislation. 
341. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 263, at 225 (recognizing that legislation may originate
from any member from either house of Congress).
342. See id. at 54 (explaining that approval is required from both the House and the Senate
before legislation goes to the president).
343. See id. at 269 (discussing Congress’s ability to override an executive veto).
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If the goal of Legislative Exhaustion is to encourage legislative
deliberation, it should bar suits by individual houses of Congress
that Congress as a whole could not bring. Indeed, it would make
little sense to bar Congress from court but allow the House or the
Senate alone to bring such suits. More importantly, allowing a
single house to sue the Executive when it is unable to convince its
legislative partner of the merits of its policy would undermine
intercameral deliberation. Bicameralism, as much as presentment,
is part of the constitutional structure designed to produce delibera-
tion on the merits of government policy.344
But for the same reason, Legislative Exhaustion might not bar
unicameral suits against the Executive when Congress has no de-
liberative remedies available to it. For example, if the President
refuses to enforce the law based on constitutional objections, it is
harder to justify denying a single house access to court on Legisla-
tive Exhaustion grounds. In such cases, no deliberative, nonjudicial
remedies are available either to Congress as a whole or to a single
house of Congress.345 Therefore, denying one house standing would
have few deliberative benefits. Conversely, permitting such suits
would allow the house to express its constitutional views in a ju-
dicial forum,346 especially when the same party controls both the
White House and one house of Congress.
Although there may be other reasons to deny a single house
standing to sue the Executive over nonenforcement,347 a Legislative
Exhaustion principle designed to encourage political deliberation on
contested government policies does not provide one.
344. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring that in order for bills to become laws, they
must be passed by both houses of Congress and be presented to the President).
345. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 12, at 358 (stating that the President’s ability not to
enforce laws he finds constitutionally objectionable allows him “to rewrite laws ... without any
direct congressional check”).
346. See Greene, supra note 1, at 582 (explaining the benefits of granting Congress
standing in court).
347. See generally Grove & Devins, supra note 1. Moreover, the injury becomes more
dubious when only one house of Congress seeks standing because the unenforced law is the
work of Congress as a whole. See Hall, supra note 118, at 28 (citing Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575, 577-78 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). For the same reason, it is particularly
difficult to conceive individual legislators establishing an injury in fact to sue the Executive
over enforcement decisions. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829-30 (1997).
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C. Institutional Realism and Responses
The argument to this point could be characterized as rather
formalist, theorizing the institutions of government at a high level
of abstraction and treating each institution as a single, unitary
actor.348 Indeed, the Framers’ conception of how interbranch conflict
would function in the new Republic was itself quite formalist. But
as discussed in Part II.A.4, the Framers failed to predict important
ways in which our political system would develop and grow over the
next two hundred odd years. Therefore, this Section turns to po-
tential objections to the Legislative Exhaustion principle from the
perspective of institutional realism. That is, this Section considers
how the Legislative Exhaustion principle might function in the real
world of the current state of partisan politics and over time.349 In
doing so, it examines a variety of realist criticisms and responses.
To begin, an institutional realist might argue that Legislative
Exhaustion and its precursor in the D.C. Circuit350 ignore the
practical realities of interbranch disputes.351 The realist would point
out that although Congress has the formal power to overrule the
Executive’s interpretation of a statute, in most cases Congress can-
not practically do so.352 The President will almost certainly oppose
any effort to overturn an agency’s interpretation of law, at least if
it is important, and the President’s veto, along with a filibuster in
the Senate (if the President’s party does not control the Senate), will
require Congress to build supermajorities to enforce its statutory
preferences.353
An institutional formalist would likely reply, “So what? That is
how the political branches are designed.”354 Still, the realist might
348. See Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and
Public Law, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (defining institutional formalism).
349. See id. (defining institutional realism).
350. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
351. See Pildes, supra note 348, at 3 (arguing “that the tension between institutionally
formalist and realist approaches [to public law] is pervasive”). 
352. See id. at 12-21 (explaining the tension between realism and formalism in describing
the role of the President).
353. In addition, there are numerous “veto gates” separate and apart from the presidential
veto and the Senate filibuster that make any legislative action exceedingly difficult. See
Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 12, at 377.
354. See Pildes, supra note 348, at 2 (explaining that institutional formalists see
governmental actors as formal agents operating with specific legal power).
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respond, the Framers designed the branches so that they would
function in a certain way.355 Broad delegations of authority and
divided government give the Executive too great an advantage in its
policy struggles with Congress, upsetting the balance among the
branches and their various constituencies that was intended to
shape government policy.356 Moreover, although failed attempts to
overrule the President might produce desirable legislative delibera-
tion, knowing the hurdles, Congress might not undertake the effort.
Foreclosing legislative lawsuits may not necessarily cause
Congress to turn to a more deliberative legislative check on the
Executive. If Congress is considering a legislative lawsuit, then it is
almost certainly a time of divided government, and the threat of a
presidential veto looms large.357 Congress may decide it is not worth
the time and energy to pass a bill that the President is likely to veto
unless Congress is confident it has the political support to override
the veto. But in some cases, foreclosing a lawsuit will encourage
legislative action, particularly if the opposition party’s base is pres-
suring its representatives in Congress to act. During the Obama
Administration, the House attempted to repeal the ACA in whole or
in part no less than sixty times, despite no prospect of overriding
President Obama’s inevitable veto.358 Indeed, until the last two
years of Obama’s second term, the House had no chance of even
securing the agreement of the Senate.359
Furthermore, this realist criticism ignores the long view. Party
control of the political branches changes over time. The fact that the
current President threatens to veto legislation does not mean the
next President will. For example, Congress did not overrule the Nix-
on Administration’s 1970 interpretation of “miner” as used in the
Black Lung Act until the Carter Administration.360 Similarly, with
the election of Donald J. Trump in 2016, the Republican Congress
355. See id. at 4.
356. See id. at 19-20 (explaining that the modern, party-driven era has effectively limited
congressional checks and balances on presidential power).
357. Cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 208, at 2340-41 (recognizing that presidential vetoes
“all but disappear during periods of unified government”).
358. See Deirdre Walsh, House Sends Obamacare Repeal Bill to White House, CNN (Jan.
6, 2016, 7:33 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/01/06/politics/house-obamacare-repeal-planned-
parenthood/ [https://perma.cc/Y9DR-7ZQM]. 
359. See id.
360. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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is in a much better position to enact its preferred interpretation of
the ACA and related appropriations or to repeal and replace the Act.
Indeed, the merits of the Act and what to do about it were a topic of
debate during the electoral campaign.361
The challenge of institutional realism is knowing how far to travel
down the rabbit hole.362 Other realist responses to legislative
lawsuits might lead to different conclusions. The institutional real-
ist described above might be called the “strong executive realist,”
focused on the practical reality of executive power to block congres-
sional moves. A “congressional gridlock realist,” however, might
point out that Congress has trouble getting anything accomplished
in the present era.363 Moreover, when Congress does manage to en-
act new policies, it often produces awkward statutes that create rich
opportunities for litigation but are difficult for Congress to refine
due to partisan deadlock.364 Yet the Executive is charged with
executing these laws in a way that accomplishes the enacting
Congress’s goals.365
Now consider the House lawsuit over the implementation of the
ACA. The congressional gridlock realist would argue that after
strong majorities in a Democratic Congress pushed through an
“inartful[ly] draft[ed]” statute,366 the Executive attempted to im-
plement the statute in a way that would accomplish the broad
statutory goal of expanding health care coverage.367 But once the
361. See, e.g., Julie Rovner, Fact-Checking Candidates on the Affordable Care Act, CNN
(Feb. 5, 2016, 5:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/05/health/voters-guide-affordable-care-
act [https://perma.cc/J74C-G3BW].
362. Legal doctrine typically treats government institutions such as the Legislature and
the Executive as a “black box .... [T]he role of judicial review is to assay the powers and
properties of the institution at a general, essentialized level that intentionally ignores these
fluid features—though these features are central ... to the way the institution actually
functions.” Pildes, supra note 348, at 2. But “[i]f legal doctrine is receptive at all to
institutional realism,” the question remains, “where should this form of realism begin and
end?” Id. at 3.
363. See id. at 34.
364. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 43 (1994) (noting that in cases
of ambiguous statutes, Congress has failed to address the matter in controversy).
365. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”).
366. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015).
367. See id. at 2487 (explaining that the IRS promulgated a rule interpreting “an Exchange
established by the State,” 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)-(c), to include both state and federal health
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Republicans took control of the House, rather than helping the
Executive with this project, they exploited the statute’s inartful
drafting to repeatedly urge the courts to adopt interpretations of the
ACA that would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the law to
accomplish its goals.368
Because one policy-making branch of government has difficulty
refining policy, the congressional gridlock realist might argue that
the courts should grant the other policy-making branch greater
discretion in how it pursues the statutory goals.369 To the extent the
Executive’s implementation of the law injures individuals, the
federal courts remain open to their suits.370 But the congressional
gridlock realist would frown upon congressional attempts to litigate
policy disputes that the legislative branch cannot resolve through
bicameralism and presentment, or worse, that the legislative branch
uses to harass the Executive. Indeed, the desire of the House to
suspend its lawsuit over the ACA after the election of Donald J.
Trump raises questions about the sincerity of its desire to compel
enforcement of the employer mandate.371
Finally, a “technocratic” or “democratic realist” might prefer
deferring to the policy-making expertise of the democratically
accountable Executive rather than giving a federal judge, or even
five Supreme Court Justices, the power to resolve the political
branches’ policy stalemates.372
insurance exchanges).
368. A group of senators as Amici Curiae argued that “[t]he plain text of the ACA reflects
a specific choice by Congress to make health insurance premium subsidies available only to
those who purchase insurance from ‘an Exchange established by the State.’” Brief of Amici
Curiae Senators John Cornyn et al. in Support of Petitioners at 3, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No.
14-114) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A)(i) (2012)). But the Supreme Court rejected this in-
terpretation because it “would destabilize the individual insurance market in any State with
a Federal Exchange and likely create the very ‘death spirals’ that Congress designed the Act
to avoid.” King, 135 S. Ct. at 2493.
369. The same institutional realism may undergird Chevron deference.
370. And if private standing is too narrow to accomplish this, then the Court should
broaden it.
371. See Jeffrey Young, House Republicans Ask Court to Delay Their Lawsuit to Blow Up
Obamacare, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 21, 2016, 7:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
entry/house-republicans-obamacare-lawsuit-delay_us_58338205e4b058ce7aacab8c
[https://perma.cc/8Q9L-DNUP].
372. Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)
(deferring to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of law based on expertise and political
accountability). 
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Thus, institutional realism can point in more than one direction,
depending on whether we are most concerned with a skewed
balance of power between the branches, congressional gridlock, or
institutional expertise and accountability.
Nevertheless, the Legislative Exhaustion principle could be
modified to address, at least in part, the concerns of the strong
executive realist. If denying congressional standing tips the balance
of power between Congress and the Executive too far in the latter’s
direction, the exhaustion requirement could be relaxed and recal-
ibrated. Rather than requiring Congress to enact its preferred policy
over the President’s all but inevitable veto, for example, the courts
might deem Congress to have exhausted its legislative remedies by
passing a bill curing the statutory ambiguity upon which the
Executive relied. Even if the President vetoed the clarifying
legislation, Congress could then go to court challenging the Execu-
tive’s interpretation and seeking a judicial endorsement of its own.
This might discourage Congress from using legislative lawsuits
merely to harass the Executive because legislators would have to go
on the record with their votes in support of the policy position
Congress brings to court.373 Furthermore, passing a statutory
amendment by majority vote would encourage legislative delibera-
tion on the merits of the policy.374 Thus, it would be consistent with
the deliberation-forcing goals of interbranch conflict.
Such a modification, however, is not likely to be appealing to
either institutional formalists or other types of institutional realists
without stronger empirical evidence and appropriate benchmarks
to demonstrate that the Executive has too much power vis-à-vis
Congress, or that suits by injured parties are not sufficient to police
executive action under current standing doctrine. But these alter-
natives illustrate how the Legislative Exhaustion principle could be
modified to address certain realist concerns if they resonate with
the Court.
In sum, Legislative Exhaustion would require congressional
plaintiffs to exhaust their legislative remedies before bringing their
373. Unlike in the case of House v. Burwell, for example, discussed infra in Part III.D, it
is unlikely that many House Republicans would have wanted to go on record supporting a
more aggressive implementation of the employer mandate (part of a statute they opposed).
374. See supra Part II.B.1 (analyzing how legislative action taken to address interbranch
conflict may increase deliberation over the merits of a policy).
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disputes with the Executive to federal court. When the Executive
refuses to enforce a statute on constitutional grounds, the court
would deem Congress to have exhausted its legislative remedies. A
certain kind of institutional realist might also deem Congress’s
legislative remedies exhausted if majorities in both houses of Con-
gress enacted a clarifying amendment that the President thereafter
vetoed. But a more formalist approach, or an approach that takes
other realist concerns into account, would bar legislative lawsuits
unless and until the President refused to enforce a law on constitu-
tional grounds.
D. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell
The federal courts recently had to address the question of congres-
sional standing in a lawsuit brought by the House of Representa-
tives against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the
Secretary of the Treasury over their implementation of the ACA.375
In the suit, the House alleged that the Secretaries’ implementation
of the ACA violated Article I of the Constitution because it usurped
Congress’s legislative and appropriations powers.376
First, the House claimed that the Secretaries usurped Congress’s
legislative powers by delaying the implementation of certain aspects
of the ACA’s “employer mandate” (the delay claim).377 The employer
mandate requires that “large employer[s]” offer affordable health
care to all of their full-time employees (FTEs) and dependents by
December 31, 2013, or they will be assessed “employer shared re-
sponsibility payments.”378 These payments shall be paid “upon
notice and demand by the Secretary.”379 The House alleged that the
Secretaries amended these statutory provisions by (1) delaying the
assessment of “[a]ny employer shared responsibility payments ...
until 2015,” and in some cases until 2016; and (2) reducing the
375. See Complaint, supra note 4, at 1-2.
376. Id. at 4 (“The House now brings this civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief
to halt these unconstitutional and unlawful actions which usurp the House’s Article I
legislative powers.”).
377. Id. at 4.
378. Id. at 14 (alteration in original) (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012)). 
379. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(d)(1).
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percentage of FTEs who must be offered insurance by certain large
employers in 2015 and 2016.380
Second, the House claimed that the Secretaries usurped the
House’s appropriations authority by making certain payments to
insurers to offset costs the insurers incurred providing “Cost-
Sharing Reductions to Beneficiaries” (the appropriations claim).381
The ACA authorizes such payments, but the House argued that
Congress never appropriated money for the payments and, there-
fore, the Secretaries violated Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the
Constitution, which provides that “No Money shall be drawn from
the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law.”382 The Secretaries contend that “[t]he cost sharing reduction
payments are being made as part of a mandatory payment program
that Congress has fully appropriated.”383
On September 9, 2015, Judge Rosemary Collyer of the D.C.
District Court issued an opinion addressing whether the House had
Article III standing to proceed with its claims.384 Judge Collyer
concluded that the House did not have standing to pursue its delay
claim, but that it did have standing to pursue the appropriations
claim.385 Judge Collyer reached this conclusion after “[d]istill[ing]”
the claims “to their essences.”386 She concluded that the House’s
objections to the manner in which the Administration implemented
the employer mandate were in essence statutory claims, whereas
the House’s objections to the Administration’s appropriations were
constitutional claims:
[T]he Non-Appropriation Theory alleges that the Executive was
unfaithful to the Constitution, while the Employer-Mandate
380. Complaint, supra note 4, at 15-16.
381. Id. at 9-11.
382. See id. at 6, 8-14 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7).
383. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint,
supra note 87, at 6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18082 (2012)).
384. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57 (D.D.C. 2015).
385. Id. at 57-58. Judge Collyer subsequently held on the merits that Congress had not
appropriated any funds to reimburse insurers for their Cost-Sharing Reductions to Bene-
ficiaries under the APA. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-01967(RMC),
2016 WL 2750934, at *7 (D.D.C. May 12, 2016). Although Judge Collyer entered an injunction
against the Secretaries, she stayed the injunction pending the parties’ appeals to the D.C.
Circuit. Id. at *19.
386. House v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 70.
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Theory alleges that the Executive was unfaithful to a statute,
the ACA. That is a critical distinction, inasmuch as the Court
finds that the House has standing to assert the first but not the
second.387
According to Judge Collyer, the first claim was a statutory claim
because the House argued that the Secretaries violated the ACA by
not enforcing the deadline.388 In contrast, the second claim was a
constitutional claim, because the House argued that the Secretaries
violated the Constitution:
Properly understood ... the Non-Appropriation Theory is not
about the implementation, interpretation, or execution of any
federal statute. It is a complaint that the Executive has drawn
funds from the Treasury without a congressional appropria-
tion—not in violation of any statute, but in violation of Article I,
§ 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution.389
At first glance, it might appear that Judge Collyer’s ruling is
consistent with Legislative Exhaustion. She allowed a constitutional
claim to proceed, while barring the statutory claim. But a closer
examination suggests that the Legislative Exhaustion principle
would bar the appropriations claim, whereas the delay claim is more
difficult for the principle than might initially be appreciated.
It is far from easy to determine whether the House’s claims are
“essentially” statutory or “essentially” constitutional. In fact, the
House claimed that the Secretaries’ actions in each case violated
both federal statutes and the Constitution.390 The House predicated
the delay claim on the violation of statutory deadlines, but the
House also claimed that the Secretaries had usurped the House’s
legislative authority when they unilaterally amended the statutory
deadlines.391 Conversely, although the theory alleged a usurpation
of the House’s appropriation power under the Constitution, it was
only because the House alleged that no statute authorized the
387. Id.
388. See id. at 75.
389. Id. at 70.
390. See Complaint, supra note 4, at 18-25.
391. See id. at 23-25.
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appropriation.392 Consequently, the Secretaries violated 31 U.S.C.
§ 1324, which prohibits disbursements except in accordance with
certain provisions not applicable here.393
The Executive defended the delay claim by arguing that it had
inherent enforcement discretion under the statute—a question of
statutory interpretation—whereas the Executive defended the ap-
propriations claim not by claiming that it had authority under the
Constitution to appropriate funds, but by asserting that the Execu-
tive was spending the funds under a “mandatory payment program
that Congress ha[d] fully appropriated.”394 Indeed, Judge Collyer ac-
knowledged that the court would resolve the merits of the appropri-
ations claim on the basis of which party had the better argument
over whether 42 U.S.C. § 18082 authorized the expenditures.395 If
that is true, then it is hard to distinguish the appropriations claim
from the delay claim—both involve questions of statutory interpre-
tation. And in each case, if the court finds that the Executive’s
interpretation of the statute is wrong, then the Executive would be
acting unconstitutionally if it did not cure its behavior.
In her subsequent decision on the merits, Judge Collyer supple-
mented her standing analysis concerning the appropriations claim
by explaining that: “[T]he interpretation of a federal statute only
becomes necessary when a defendant raises such a statute as a
defense. Such a defense does not turn a constitutional claim into a
statutory dispute. The House’s injury depends on the Constitution
and not on the U.S. Code.”396
This explanation is no more satisfying. Whenever Congress
alleges that executive action is not authorized by statute, it can cast
its claim either as a constitutional claim that the Executive violated
Article I, Section 1397 or as a claim that the Executive violated the
Administrative Procedure Act based on the Executive’s erroneous
392. See id. at 13-14.
393. See 31 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012).
394. Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Complaint,
supra note 87, at 6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18082 (2012)).
395. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 81 (D.D.C. 2015).
396. U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, No. 14-cv-01967(RMC), 2016 WL 2750934,
at *19 (D.D.C. May 12, 2016).
397. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States.”).
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interpretation of the relevant statute.398 Similarly, Congress can
cast a claim that the Executive appropriated unappropriated funds
either as a claim that the Executive violated Article I, Section 9,
Clause 7399 or as a claim that the Executive violated 31 U.S.C.
§ 1324.400 Indeed, in House v. Burwell, the House asserted both
statutory and constitutional claims concerning the same executive
conduct. It would be strange if a federal court’s decision whether to
hear an interbranch dispute turned on such arbitrary pleading.
Indeed, distilling the claims to their essences, as Judge Collyer
suggested, one would think that the central issue in the case,
regardless of how the claims were framed, was whether Congress
had authorized the Executive’s actions by statute and by appropria-
tions.
Thus, it is hard to understand how the Executive’s interpretation
of its authority under a statute is any different than its interpreta-
tion of its authority under an appropriations act. Many areas exist
in which the Executive cannot act without congressional authoriza-
tion.401 Whenever there is a claim that the Executive exceeds its
statutory authority, the claim could be converted into a constitu-
tional claim that the Executive usurped Congress’s legislative
authority. But the constitutional claim in such cases is meaning-
less—“full of sound and fury, Signifying nothing.”402 Unless the
Executive asserts a constitutional prerogative in its defense, the
court will review the Executive’s action based on whether the
Executive had statutory authority for what it was doing, regardless
of whether the action involves a disbursement of funds or the
nonenforcement of a deadline.
The Legislative Exhaustion principle would focus instead on
whether Congress has nonjudicial means to obtain the relief that it
seeks. This requires looking at both Congress’s claim and the
Executive’s defense. If the Executive defends its actions based on
statutory authority, then Congress has the means to give itself the
398. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2012) (forbidding agency action “in excess of statutory juris-
diction, authority, or limitations”).
399. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”).
400. 31 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012) (prohibiting disbursements except in accordance with certain
exceptions).
401. See Beermann, supra note 106, at 72.
402. Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 5, sc. 5.
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remedy it desires. In House v. Burwell, Congress could repeal or
amend the statutory provision under which the Executive claimed
authority to spend the funds.403 Congress could include a rider in its
next appropriations stating: “no funds shall be disbursed from the
Treasury to pay the cost-sharing reductions authorized by § 18071
of the ACA.” But of course this would require legislative deliberation
over the merits of withdrawing support for insurers to offset the
cost-sharing reductions they provided to beneficiaries.404
Interestingly, the delay claim is more difficult for the Legislative
Exhaustion principle than its statutory basis would indicate. It is
certainly a claim that the Executive violated a statutory mandate.
But violations of statutory deadlines are particularly difficult for
Congress to cure with new legislation.405 Put simply, how much
clearer can Congress be about when it wants the Executive to act?
There is no ambiguity about the effective date of the employer-
mandate provisions. Therefore, unlike the Secretaries’ interpreta-
tion of their appropriations authority, which Congress can overrule
with a clear appropriations rider, Congress cannot do anything to
make a statutory deadline clearer. Thus, it might appear as though
Congress has exhausted its legislative remedies and that the
Executive had asserted a new and more expansive kind of enforce-
ment discretion.
A closer look at the ACA provisions, however, suggests this is a
traditional use of enforcement discretion. The ACA provides that
employer shared responsibility payments shall be paid “upon notice
and demand by the Secretary.”406 But the statute does not provide
any guidelines for when the Secretary shall demand payment.407
There is a robust debate, beyond the scope of this Article, concerning
the limits of enforcement discretion, particularly when the Execu-
tive prospectively declares that it shall not enforce a law in certain
403. See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, supra
note 87, at 6 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18082 (2012) as authorizing the use of funds).
404. See Beerman, supra note 106, at 69.
405. See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can
Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1381, 1419-22 (2011).
406. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(d)(1) (2012).
407. Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985) (noting the presumption against
reviewability “may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the
agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers”).
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categories of cases.408 But whatever those limits, the question for
Legislative Exhaustion is whether Congress has nonjudicial reme-
dies available to it. In this case, it does. Congress could not only
circumscribe the Secretary’s enforcement discretion—for example,
with a statutory provision directing that “whenever the Secretary
has probable cause to believe that an employer owes a shared
responsibility payment under § 1513, the Secretary shall make a
demand for payment”—it could also make the shared responsibility
payments automatic as part of the employer’s income taxes. Again,
undertaking either of these solutions would require members of the
House to convince their colleagues of the merits of the shared re-
sponsibility payments. But the 114th Congress had no interest in
promoting the merits of any aspect of the ACA.409
Still, this leaves the vexing problem of agency delays.410 Should
Congress have standing to sue the Executive over its violation of a
clear statutory deadline? This is probably one of the most chal-
lenging claims for the Legislative Exhaustion principle. On the one
hand, without a new and expansive understanding of enforcement
discretion permitting the Executive to ignore statutory deadlines
absent some (admittedly difficult to conceive) guidelines to constrain
its discretion, there is no legislative action by which Congress can
make its deadline any clearer.411 Moreover, the Executive does not
typically defend the violation of statutory deadlines by pointing to
statutory or constitutional authority; more often it accepts culp-
ability and asserts that it is doing the best it can with the available
resources and its other priorities.412 On the other hand, many
408. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, The Legality of Delaying Key Elements of the ACA, 370 NEW
ENG. J. MEDICINE 1967 (2014); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty,
67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014).
409. Indeed, Judge Collyer held that the House did not have standing to pursue its
employer mandate claims for a second reason—the House had asked for no remedy to redress
the Secretaries’ failure to implement the employer mandate more expeditiously. U.S. House
of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 76 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]he House does not
seek injunctive relief with regard to the employer mandate.”). It is illustrative of the political
nature of these types of lawsuits that the House sought no relief.
410. See generally Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 405 (discussing agency delays).
411. The merits of such an expansion of enforcement discretion is beyond the scope of this
Article, but under existing doctrine, most courts feel obligated to “compel agency action un-
lawfully withheld” as best that they can, when an agency misses an express statutory
deadline. See id. at 1403 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012)); id. at 1403 n.100 (collecting cases).
412. See id. at 1393 (discussing some of the factors that may be involved in agency delays).
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administrative delays stem from problems Congress created or has
left unaddressed.413 Should federal courts hear claims by Congress
that a large benefits program is not rendering decisions in compli-
ance with statutory deadlines when it has starved the agency of
resources to hire the decision makers needed to process the benefits
claims in a timely manner?414
There is no avoiding the need for careful analysis of the nature of
the interbranch dispute and the exercise of judgment by the court.
If the failure to comply with the statutory deadline is caused by
resource constraints or the Executive’s understanding of statutory
priorities, then the Legislative Exhaustion principle should bar
Congress from federal court because Congress has deliberative
legislative remedies available to it. On the other hand, if the delay
is based on presidential priorities that Congress cannot directly
check,415 then Legislative Exhaustion should not bar the congressio-
nal suit.416
E. Raines, Coleman, and Legislative Lawsuits
Legislative Exhaustion is consistent with the outcomes in Raines
v. Byrd417 and Coleman v. Miller.418 The legislative plaintiffs in
Raines objected to the President’s use of the line-item veto pursuant
to the Line Item Veto Act.419 But as the Court pointed out, the leg-
islators could remedy their alleged harm by convincing their
colleagues to repeal the Act.420 Moreover, there was no statutory
ambiguity at all for a court to resolve. The legislators were merely
upset that they had lost in the legislative process and did not like
the law that their colleagues had passed.421 No matter the specific
413. See id. at 1397-98.
414. See Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3-4).
415. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533-34 (2007) (holding that the agency
cannot justify its inaction by pointing to the President’s priorities).
416. Although these judgments will be difficult when Congress challenges the Executive’s
failure to meet a hard and fast deadline, they will be less difficult than satisfactorily resolving
the injury-in-fact test in a broad swath of legislative lawsuits.
417. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
418. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
419. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 816.
420. See id. at 824, 829.
421. See id.
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requirements of Legislative Exhaustion, permitting congressional
losers into court would undermine the deliberation functions of
Congress, so Raines is an easy case.
The exhaustion question is trickier in Coleman. Had the State
Legislature exhausted its remedies against the Kansas Secretary of
State? The Kansas Senate could have revoted on the resolution for
ratification of the amendment and attempted to produce a clearer
rejection of ratification.422 But in the view of the Kansas Senate it
had already rejected the proposed amendment and the state execu-
tive officials were refusing to recognize the validity of that vote
based on their interpretation of Article V of the U.S. Constitution.423
Moreover, even if the Kansas Senate had voted more decisively
against ratification a second time, it is not clear whether it would
have been effective. First, the Court has generally left the validity
of ratification to Congress’s discretion as a political question.424
Second, although the Kansas Senate tried to muster the political
will to decisively defeat ratification, Congress might have deemed
the amendment ratified, making any action by the Kansas Senate
too little, too late.425
Thus, Coleman is an unusual case, but it is probably most
analogous to a situation in which the Executive refused to follow the
legislature’s direction based on its different constitutional views. In
such cases, the legislature has exhausted its deliberation-producing
legislative remedies. Therefore, the Legislative Exhaustion principle
would not bar the case from federal court.
F. Chadha, Windsor, and Congressional Defense
Finally, Legislative Exhaustion is consistent with the Court’s ap-
proach to congressional intervention in cases such as INS v.
422. Cf. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436.
423. See id. at 446-47.
424. See id. at 450 (“[T]he efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures [after a] previous
rejection or attempted withdrawal[] should be regarded as a political question pertaining to
the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its
control over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment.”).
425. See id. at 448-49 (noting that Congress ratified the Fourteenth Amendment despite
Ohio’s and New Jersey’s attempts to withdraw their ratifications).
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Chadha426 and United States v. Windsor,427 even though it sheds
no light on the Court’s recognition of the Executive’s standing to
defend laws the President believes are unconstitutional. Although
the courts will probably not have to confront this question in the
wake of Windsor,428 permitting Congress to intervene in such suits
as a party is unlikely to distract or deter it from legislative delib-
eration. Moreover, in such cases, the Executive is choosing not to
defend the law based on its constitutional objections. There is no
statute that needs clarifying through legislative action, and
litigation may be the only way for the Legislature to engage in a
constitutional dialogue with the other branches.
CONCLUSION
The Legislative Exhaustion principle provides a relatively easy
way to resolve suits in which the Executive purports to act pursuant
to statutory authority. In such cases, Legislative Exhaustion sug-
gests that the opponents of legislative standing are correct in
requiring Congress to rely on legislative tools to resolve interbranch
disputes. This principle enables the courts to avoid grappling with
whether institutional injuries are sufficiently concrete to support
Article III standing.
But Legislative Exhaustion would not prevent Congress from
challenging presidential decisions not to enforce the law based on
constitutional objections. In such cases, the tools that Congress can
use to punish the Executive are unlikely to produce deliberation on
the merits of the interbranch policy dispute. There may be other
reasons to bar Congress from court, but neither Legislative Ex-
haustion nor the deliberation-forcing goals of interbranch conflict
provide one.
426. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
427. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
428. See supra text accompanying note 17.
